

Woman in the Theological Anthropology of St. Thomas Aquinas

by

Sr. Catherine Thomas Brennan, O.P.

A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in Theology

Director: Dr. Stephen Long

Second Reader: Fr. Matthew Lamb

**Ave Maria University
May 1, 2013**

Totus Tuus

To my Mothers
in Heaven and on earth

Introduction

The question of St. Thomas' precise view of woman has been fiercely debated in recent decades, with depictions ranging from Thomas the misogynist to Thomas the proto-feminist. Following John Paul II's call for a "New Feminism" in his 1995 apostolic letter "*Evangelium Vitae*," and looking to Edith Stein and John Paul II as luminaries, thinkers in the New Feminism vein have consciously taken the robust hylomorphism of St. Thomas as the theoretical foundation of an authentic Christian feminism. However, the question of Thomas' view of women per se has been very little addressed in this same vein until quite recently.¹ Even feminists thinkers favorably disposed toward aspects of Thomas' thought and who are unwilling to "throw the tot out with the bathwater," tend to characterize the Doctor of Aquino as misogynistic.² Without explicitly crying misogyny, Kristin M. Popik, Richard J. McGowan, and Kari Børresen argue convincingly that Thomas' doctrine of woman includes the imperfection of woman *qua* woman with respect to man *qua* man.³ More recently, thinkers committed to the

¹ "In transforming culture so that it supports life, women occupy a place, in thought and action, which is unique and decisive. It depends on them to promote a "new feminism" which rejects the temptation of imitating models of "male domination", in order to acknowledge and affirm the true genius of women in every aspect of the life of society, and overcome all discrimination, violence and exploitation" (EV 99).

http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html. For the prominence of Thomas' hylomorphism in the New Feminism, cf. Edith Stein, "Ethos of Woman's Professions," p. 45, *Essays on Woman*, trans. Freda Mary Oben, pp. "Spirituality of the Christian Woman," pp. 94-7, "Problems of Women's Education," pp. 182-3; John Paul II, *Mulieris Dignitatem*, n. 21, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_15081988_mulieris-dignitatem_en.html; *Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body*, trans. Michael Waldstein, Pauline Books & Media: Boston, 2006, 66:6, 98:7. Sr. Prudence Allen, RSM, "Philosophy of Relation in John Paul II's New Feminism," *Women in Christ*, ed. Michele M. Schumacher, Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, 2004, pp. 69-73. Beatriz Vollmer Coles, "New Feminism: A Sex-Gender Reunion," *Women in Christ*, ed. Michele M. Schumacher, Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, 2004, pp. 63-4.

² cf. Diana Fritz Crates, review of *Aquinas, Feminism, and the Common Good* (Susan M. DeCrane, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C.: 2004) in *Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics* (2006) 26, 221-3

³ Richard J. McGowan, "The Imperfection of Woman in Thomas's Doctrine of Woman," (Ph.D. diss., Marquette University, 1985). Kristin M. Popik, "The Philosophy of Woman of St. Thomas Aquinas," Part I in *Faith & Reason* IV(4) 1978: 16-56; Part II in *Faith & Reason* V (1979): 40-70. Kari Elisabeth Børresen, *Subordination and Equivalence: the Nature and Role of Woman in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Charles H. Talbot, Washington, D.C., University Press of America: 1981. Børresen makes the case for "anthropocentrism" but not misogyny per se in the thought of SS. Augustine and Thomas.

thought of St. Thomas have defended Aristotle and Thomas against charges of misogyny and have proposed his theological anthropology as a sure basis for a Christian feminism.⁴

It may be asked why another treatment of St. Thomas on women is necessary or desirable. When so many others have already treated the question of Thomas' account of woman, and if his argument for woman's imperfection with respect to man is bound up with the errors of an antiquated biology, can we not simply dispense with the conclusions and move on in order to harvest the vast expanses of wisdom that still remain in his thought? Unfortunately, to dispense thus with the conclusions would be to dismiss not only the facts of an antiquated biology, which is necessary, but also to risk dismissing the anthropological and theological principles that have the biology intertwined with them. It will be one of the principal aims of this study to show to what degree the Aristotelian biology of sexual differentiation informs Thomas' theological anthropology. Furthermore, the principles of Aristotelian physics and biology and the conception of the relative dignity and perfection of men and women flowing from them reach much further into Thomas' philosophy and theology than it might seem at first glance. We expect to find reverberations of these in his theology of ecclesial ministry and in his treatment of sacraments of Orders and Matrimony. However we also find the same troublesome theory of generation intertwined in his theology of creation and the transmission of original sin; in his account of

⁴ Cf. Joseph F. Hartel, *Femina Ut Imago Dei in the Integral Feminism of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Pontifical Gregorian University: Rome 1993; Michael Nolan, "The Aristotelian Background to Aquinas' Denial that 'Woman is a Defective Male,'" *The Thomist* (64): 2000, 21-69; Pia de Solenni, *A Hermeneutic of Aquinas' Mens through a Sexually Differentiated Epistemology: Towards an Understanding of Woman as Imago Dei*. Apollinare Studi: Rome, 2000. It is beyond the aim of this study to engage the question of whether Thomas is a misogynist or not. Others have discussed the question and it is not the subject of the present investigation. Thomas' account clearly affirms a serious inferiority of women in the intellectual, moral, economic, and political orders, but just as clearly affirms a radical equality of men and women in their supernatural vocation before God, as will be seen. It must be granted that there were limitations bound up with the science and socio-cultural matrix of his day, and also that as a 13th-century Dominican Friar whose principal duties were prayer, preaching, teaching and writing, his personal involvement with women was extremely limited. However, by natural temperament and supernatural vocation, Thomas was a man singularly open to reality. As a form of willful blindness to reality, misogyny is utterly foreign to Thomas' characteristic affinity for truth, and to the charity of the saint. In short, my position is that while Thomas affirms that woman is inferior to man in anthropologically significant ways, he is not a misogynist.

moral and political, and family life; and in his account of the Incarnation itself and in his discussion of the Immaculate Conception. It is represented in every major division of the *Summa*. This is not to say that the arguments for these various doctrines are solely or even primarily biological, but to indicate how pervasive the implications of the science he inherited from Aristotle are. Committed Thomists are faced with a true *aporia*, a knot. There are strands of argument that need to be unravelled--what belongs to revelation rightly interpreted, what belongs to one individual's experience of human nature and reality at a particular time and place, what belongs to a body of scientific data now known to be false, and what belongs to the experience of a particular cultural situation. This is not to tear the system apart, but to distinguish clearly the false from the true in order to build upon the solid rock of what belongs to reality as known by natural reason and revealed by God. Again, this is not to cut down a rotten tree, but to prune the branches of a flourishing tree so that it can grow even more. This is the task that Thomas would be the first to undertake with the benefit of modern science, since a mistake about creation may lead to error concerning the creator but true science can never contradict sacred doctrine.⁵

The main thesis of this study is that with his account of sexual differentiation pruned of the limitations of antiquated science, the Angelic Doctor offers the principles upon which to base a complete theology of the image of God in man and woman. His is the most solid foundation of a Christian feminism which considers woman in her whole being: as an embodied spirit created

⁵ "[A]liarum scientiarum principia vel sunt per se nota, et probari non possunt, vel per aliquam rationem naturalem probantur in aliqua alia scientia. Propria autem huius scientiae cognitio est, quae est per revelationem, non autem quae est per naturalem rationem. Et ideo non pertinet ad eam probare principia aliarum scientiarum, sed solum iudicare de eis, quidquid enim in aliis scientiis invenitur veritati huius scientiae repugnans, totum condemnatur ut falsum, unde dicitur II Cor. X, consilia destruentes, et omnem altitudinem extollentem se adversus scientiam Dei" (ST I Q. 1 art. 6 ad 2); "Errores namque qui circa creaturam sunt, interdum a fidei veritate abducunt, secundum quod verae Dei cognitioni repugnant" (SCG II.3.1)

in wisdom and love as an image of the Triune God, redeemed by Christ, and destined for eternal beatitude in the contemplation of the divine essence with all the angels and saints.⁶

To this end, the study is divided into two parts. In the first part, we explain St. Thomas' philosophy and theology of woman and attempt to account for his assertions that woman is an *occasionatus* male (*femina est mas occasionatus*) and that woman is weaker than man with respect to reason (*debilior rationis quam vir*), with their corollary of the natural subjection of woman to man, in the premises of mistaken elements of Aristotelian biology. These mistaken premises are *femina est mas occasionatus* and the application of the categories of agent/patient, male/female, more perfect/less perfect, matter/form to the generation process. In the second part, we will continue this investigation of the repercussions of these erroneous biological data in Thomas' account of the image of God in man and woman. Also in this part we will consider some of the contemporary science of sexual differentiation and present St. Thomas anthropological principles pruned of the errors that limit them from fully bearing fruit. Both Thomas and Aristotle look to the material element of human nature and the generation process in particular for the efficient cause and the teleology of sexual differentiation. This remains a valid approach, but if we accept the data of modern science, we remove their premises for asserting that there is a nobler sex and that woman is *occasionata*. Finally, we briefly point to John Paul II's theology of the body as an example of a contemporary account of the *imago Dei* in man and woman consciously based on the principles of St. Thomas but free of the limitations imposed by ancient biology and of certain socio-cultural sensibilities that are no longer widely shared.

⁶ cf. Hartel, *Femina Ut Imago Dei* 335-6; de Solenni *Aquinas' Mens* 81; "Christian Feminism: A Fuller View of Woman," interview with de Solenni, accessed May 1, 2013, <http://www.catholiceducation.org/articles/feminism/fe0022.html>

Part I

St. Thomas on Human Nature and the Beginning of the Hard Sayings

Woman in the order of St. Thomas' theology

In a general and implicit way, throughout the whole of Thomas' corpus, woman appears wherever human nature appears because male and female are accidental differences between members of a single species.⁷ Specifically and explicitly, woman as such appears in many scattered places in every major division of the *Summa Theologiae*, as already mentioned. However, the immediate context of St. Thomas' most focused theological treatment of woman in herself is the treatise on the creation of man (*homo*) in the Prima Pars of the *Summa Theologiae*. Q. 92 on the production of woman is preceded by QQ. 75-90, which concern the human creature which is composed of matter and spirit. These questions treat the essence, power, and operations of the human soul, as well as its immediate creation by God. The word translated as "man" in this section is *homo*; this is a fitting translation option since, following the order of the Genesis narrative, the man is alone before the creation of woman. Since the meaning of *homo* includes both *vir* and *mulier*, it is warranted or rather necessary to read what is said of human nature as applying both to man and to woman. Immediately following Q. 92 on the *productione mulieris* is Q. 93 on the *termino productionis hominis*, the term of the production of man, namely, that man (i.e. *vir* and *mulier*) was created to the image and likeness of God. Following this is Thomas' treatment of the state of original innocence and holiness of body and soul in which man and

⁷ "Sed non conveniunt animali secundum substantiam et formam, sed ex parte materiae et corporis. Quod patet ex hoc, quod idem sperma potest fieri masculus et femina, secundum quod diversimode patitur aliquam passionem; quia cum fuerit calor operans fortis, fiet masculus; cum autem erit debilis, fiet femina. Hoc autem non posset esse vel contingere, si masculus et femina differrent specie. Non enim ex uno semine diversa secundum speciem producuntur. Quia in semine vis est activa, et omne agens naturale agit ad determinatam speciem, quia agit sibi simile. Unde relinquitur quod masculus et femina non differant secundum formam, nec sunt diversa secundum speciem" (In Met. X.11.2134)

woman were created, the preservation of the human species, and of the place in which they were created, namely paradise. The general context for Thomas' doctrine of woman, then, is God's wise and loving order of creation in the perfect beauty of original innocence, and specifically the creation of man and woman to the image and likeness of God. With this in mind, we turn to his concept of human nature as the nature of man and woman.

Human Nature According to St. Thomas

Before treating the distinctions between man and woman in Thomas' account of human nature, it is necessary to discuss his account of human nature in general. Since the purpose of this brief and general exposition of the main points of Thomas' anthropology before investigating his discussion of women is simply to outline what, on his account, makes a human being a human being, many questions and issues which merit sustained attention will have to be left unraised and unanswered. Fortunately many such have been well treated by others already, not least by Thomas himself. What is human nature? As with the nature of other living material beings, human nature is a composite of a formal principle and a material principle. The formal principle in man (in this case "man" considered as *homo*, not man considered as *vir*) is the soul. This is in contrast to the Platonic view according to which the soul acts upon the body as a mover or as a captain of a ship, and which admits a plurality of souls, according as the person is moved in a variety of ways. Thomas' hylomorphic view sees the soul not merely as a mover of the body but as the form of the body. The two principles form a unity. Thus a human being is not a soul in a body, but is one composite substance of body and soul, even as all material beings are a composite of matter and form.⁸

⁸ The Council of Vienne (1311-1312) affirmed *de fide* that man is a composite of soul and body. Cf. Karl Rahner, ed. *The Sources of Catholic Dogma*, Herder: Freiburg, 1954, trans. Roy J. Deferrari, 1955, 190.

The one soul of man has three sets of powers, that is, three distinct principles of activity.⁹ The first of these is the so-called vegetative power, and the operations of this power are nutrition, growth, and reproduction, i.e. to eat, to drink, to sleep, to grow, and to generate offspring. These functions are shared by plants, brute animals, and men (*homines*). The second of the three powers is the sensitive power, which includes both sense apprehension and sense appetite. The apprehensive sense powers include the five external senses of sight, hearing, taste, touch, and smell, and the internal senses of imagination, particular reason, sense memory, and common sense.¹⁰ The sensitive appetite is basically synonymous with the passions and emotions, of which Thomas lists love, hatred, desire, aversion, joy, sadness, hope, despair, fear, daring, and anger.¹¹ These powers man shares with the brute animals. Now in the higher animals, the male and female factors of generation are not united in individuals, as they are in plants. Male and female animals are separate and distinct individuals of the species come together for generation; thus the purpose of sexual differentiation is primarily for the sake of generation. Michael Nolan argues that for Aristotle and Thomas, the distinction of the sexes reveals that animals have a function higher than generation to which they are ordered. Nolan quotes Aristotle on the knowledge garnered by sense perception:

A plant, in its essence, has no function or activity to perform other than the formation of its seed...All animals however have some measure of knowledge of a sort (some have more, some less, some very little indeed), because they have sense-perception, and sense-perception is of course a sort of knowledge...Now it is by sense-perception that animals differ from the creatures which are merely alive.

⁹ *Summa Theologiae*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Christian Classics: 1981. <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/>, I. 76.1.

¹⁰ Memory is a power belonging both to the sensitive power and to the intellective power. There is an intellectual memory as well as a sense memory, the former being a kind of storehouse of intellectual forms and the latter a kind of storehouse for sense impressions, cf. ST I.79.6, 7

¹¹ ST I-II.23.4. The passions of love and hatred differ from the love and hatred in the will as acts of the sensitive appetite differ from acts of the rational appetite. The former are consequent upon sense apprehension, the latter upon the apprehension of reason. Cf. ST I.20.1, I-II.26.1

He concludes that “Animals accordingly exist for a higher purpose than generating, namely, the purpose of knowing and experiencing the world in which they live...For both [female and male animals] generating is something secondary.”¹² If this holds for animals, Nolan implies, than *a fortiori* it holds for man and woman as well: neither man nor woman are ordered simply toward generating offspring, but for knowing.

Both the vegetative and sensitive powers are truly powers of the soul, but they are able to act only in and through a material organ. This is easiest to understand with the external senses. Take Bob, a man with well-functioning eyes. When Bob sees, it is not Bob’s eye that sees, but Bob who sees with his eye. Take away the eye and neither Bob nor the eye sees. It is the matter-form, body-soul composite that sees, and it is likewise the composite that imagines, that becomes angry or sorrowful, that eats, sleeps, or generates offspring. Not all of man’s powers require a material organ, however. Unlike the other animals which are ordered to the sort of knowledge that sense perception is, “*Homo autem adhuc ordinatur ad nobilius opus vitae, quod est intelligere*—Mankind is ordered to a nobler work of life, which is understanding.”¹³ The third power of the soul is the rational power, and as with the sensitive faculties, there are apprehensive rational powers and appetitive rational powers. The intellect is the apprehensive rational power and it is directed to knowing reality in itself; the will is the rational appetite which desires the *bonum universale*—the good in general, the universal good. Unlike sense apprehension and sense appetite, the acts of the intellect and will are not acts of a material organ, but acts of the immaterial soul. Although “knowledge begins in the senses”¹⁴ for man, knowledge does not end in the senses. The intellect draws upon phantasms, which are drawn in their turn from sense

¹² Aristotle, *On the Generation of Animals* I.23.731a24, qtd in Michael Nolan, “The Aristotelian Background to Aquinas’ Denial that ‘Woman is a Defective Male,’” *The Thomist* 64(2000): 36.

¹³ ST I.92.1

¹⁴ ST I.12.12

perception and thus it is the natural and normal way of the intellect's functioning to be joined to the body. There are acts of the intellect and will, however, which are possible not only for the composite but even for man's soul alone, separated from the body. In the order of dignity, man's spiritual soul sets him apart from and above the entire material universe.¹⁵ Each soul is created immediately by God *ex nihilo*. In the first creation, even the bodies of the first man and the first woman were created immediately by God, that is, God alone created their bodies without the mediation of the angels or of any other creature.¹⁶

The Equality of Woman and Man Before God

Thomas locates the image of God in man and woman precisely in the rational nature. "Man is said to be the image of God by reason of his intellectual nature," and this "image of God, in its principal signification, namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman."¹⁷ In addition to being a knowing and choosing being, the human being is also social by nature. "[M]an is naturally a social being," and even before the Fall, "in the state of innocence he would have led a social life."¹⁸ For Thomas, the creation of the first woman from the rib of the first man signifies, among other things, the social orientation of human life even in its innocence. She was not created from man's feet, that he might not despise her as if she were in servile subjection to him as a slave; nor was she created from his head, because she is not to rule over him. They are to live a *socialis conjunctio*, a union of companionship.¹⁹ Between husband and

¹⁵cf. Joseph F. Hartel, "The Integral Feminism of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Gregorianum*, vol. 77, Fasc. 3 (1996), 6

¹⁶ ST I. 91.2, 4

¹⁷ ST I.93.4, sed contra and ad 1

¹⁸ ST I. 96.4

¹⁹ "*Neque enim mulier debet dominari in virum, et ideo non est formata de capite. Neque debet a viro despici, tanquam serviliter subiecta, et ideo non est formata de pedibus.*" ST I. 92. 3

wife, Thomas claims in another place, there is the greatest friendship.²⁰ Thomas' consideration of the question of the sexual act in the state of innocence reveals a mind utterly free of any morbid Manichean preoccupations. He firmly asserts that the procreation of children before the Fall would have been through copulation, a common-sense reading of the "Be fruitful and multiply" of Genesis 1:28 and of the book of nature but one which even a number of Fathers refused to grant.²¹ Thomas goes even further when he asserts that on account of the perfect integrity of man and woman in body and soul making them even more perfectly attuned in all their physical, emotional and spiritual powers to all that is good, loveable, and according to nature, the sexual act in the state of innocence would have been accompanied by even greater pleasure.²²

Moving from the order of creation to the orders of grace and glory, the intellectual nature can be satisfied with nothing less than the contemplation of truth itself, the beatific vision of God Himself, in which eternal life in heaven consists.²³ Both men and women are called to this same supernatural end, called "supernatural" because it surpasses the powers of human nature considered in itself to attain. He refutes arguments that woman should not have been created and the absurd claim made in some apocryphal literature²⁴ that the risen bodies in heaven would all be male. It comes as no surprise that for the Angelic Doctor, according to whom glory perfects grace even as grace perfects nature²⁵, the presence the feminine sex will be present in heavenly glory: "this very distinction of nature among human beings will point out the perfection of nature

²⁰ "Inter virum autem et uxorem maxima amicitia esse videtur." SCG III.123.6

²¹ e.g. John Damascene, *Orthodox Faith* 4.24 in *Genesis 1-11*, Ed. Louth, Andrew, *Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture: Old Testament*, Volume I, IVP Academic: 2001, 41, 93 ; Chrysostom, *Homilies on Genesis*, 18.12 in *Ancient Christian Commentaries Series*, vol. I, 37, 103

²² ST I.98.2 ad 3

²³ cf. SCG III.37-40

²⁴ The apocryphal "Gospel of Thomas" ends on the following note: "Simon Peter said to them, 'Let Mary leave us, for women are not worthy of life.' Jesus said, 'I myself shall lead her in order to make her male, so that she too may become a living spirit resembling you males. For every woman who will make herself male will enter the kingdom of heaven.' The Gospel According to Thomas." "Gospel of Thomas," trans. Thomas O. Lambd in *The Nag Hammadi Library in English*. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988.

²⁵ ST I.93.4; I.1.8.

and the divine wisdom as well.”²⁶ The presence of the feminine sex in glory will show not only the full perfection of woman, but together with the masculine sex will display the full perfection of human nature, and this distinction will be a manifestation of the divine wisdom itself.

The Beginning of the Hard Sayings and their Roots in Aristotle’s Biology

Having established the human nature and *telos* Thomas holds to be common to men and women, it remains to be seen what is distinct. Thomas makes a number of statements about women that ring strangely in modern ears. First, following Aristotle: “*femina est mas occasionatus*”—woman is an *occasionatus* male,” “*per respectum ad naturam particularem, femina est aliquid deficiens et occasionatum*”—with respect to the particular nature, woman is something deficient and *occasionatus*.²⁷ This word “*occasionatus*” is usually translated “misbegotten,” but to do so is to translate with a liberal dose of interpretation, as will be shown. Second: “*Mulier naturaliter est minoris virtutis et dignitatis quam vir*—woman is naturally of less strength and dignity than man.”²⁸ Third: “*naturaliter femina subiecta est viro*—woman is naturally subject to man.”²⁹ Finally, an important point of contact with regard to the theology of the body: “in a secondary sense the image of God is found in man, and not in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as God is the beginning and end of every creature.”³⁰

²⁶ SCG IV.88.3: On the Sex and Age of the Resurrected. “In like fashion, also, the frailty of the feminine sex is not in opposition to the perfection of the risen. For this frailty is not due to a shortcoming of nature, but to an intention of nature. And this very distinction of nature among human beings will point out the perfection of nature and the divine wisdom as well, which disposes all things in a certain order.”

²⁷ ST I.92.1, obj 1, ad 1

²⁸ ST I.92 obj 2. This particular formulation of the principle of woman’s relative weakness and lesser dignity vis-à-vis the man was chosen for the provocativeness of its language. Although it occurs in an objection, and not in the Respondeo or in the response to that objection, not only does Thomas not argue against this principle here, but he in fact re-states the principle repeatedly in other places. We are safe in ascribing this principle to Thomas; what it *means* remains to be shown. All of the preceding applies equally to the principle *Femina est mas occasionatus*.

²⁹ ST I. 92.1 ad 2

³⁰ ST I. 93.4 ad 1

Hartel has taken great pains to explicate the Aristotelian biology, physics and cosmology that underlie Thomas' understanding of human generation, and his work is singularly helpful in revealing the degree to which Thomas' conclusions regarding the differences of the male and female are conclusions *properly drawn* from principles inherited from Aristotle, and the degree to which this informs Thomas' theology of creation and theological anthropology. Aristotle and Thomas following him searched for the reasons why and how it is that in animals the male and female are such different instances of one and the same species, and they looked to the process of generation for the answer. The male is by definition that which generates in another, and the female that which generates in itself.³¹ Hartel explains that for Aristotle, there are three factors which are determinative in the generation process, and the single most important factor in the process of human generation is vital heat.³² The right proportion of heat is necessary for conception to take place, and determines the sex of the child conceived. On Aristotle's account, in the generation of animals where there is a male and a female, the male contributes the active principle (semen) and the female contributes the passive principle, the matter called *catamenia*. The male principle does not add matter to the conception, but it contains the principle of vital heat and it generates by setting up movement which forms the matter of the *catamenia* into the

³¹ GA1.2.716a15. Sr. Prudence Allen polemicizes the Aristotelian view of the generation process when she describes it as "a battle of the sexes," but she is right to point out that male and female are logical contraries, and this does involve the interaction of the contrary male and female principles with the effect that the resulting offspring resemble more, with respect to sex or physical appearance, the parent whose principle had the greater influence in the conception process (*The Concept of Woman*, vol. I. Cf. Aristotle GA 767b 21-25)

³² Hartel, "The Integral Feminism of St. Thomas Aquinas," 8-10. There are cases in which temperature actually does determine sex, as in the *Alligator mississippiensis*: an average incubation temperature of 85 degrees results in female hatchlings, at the higher temperature of 89 degrees there are equal numbers of male and female, and at 91 degrees all hatchlings will be male, cf. M. W. J. Ferguson and T. Joanen, "Temperature of egg incubation determines sex in *Alligator mississippiensis*," *Nature* 296 (1980):850-852.

fetus.³³ The disposition of the *catamenia* supplied by the female and other external factors can also contribute to the sex of the child conceived.³⁴

Femina est mas occasionatus: Natura Particulara and Natura Universalis

Thomas, following Aristotle, holds that the active power of the male principle always tends to reproduce itself; it achieves its object when it generates another male, and if it generates a female, some factor has intervened to thwart its natural trajectory.³⁵ For Aristotle, “the female is, as it were, a *peperomenon* male,” where *peperomenon* may be translated as “deformed”, “imperfectly developed,” “under-developed,” “malformed,” or “mutilated.”³⁶ It is the passive participle of the verb *πηρόω*, to maim or disable. This statement was received by the Latins when it was translated as *femina est mas occasionatus*. Much needs to be said in explanation on this point.

Aristotle uses the term *peperomenon* literally for animals whose legs have been cut away, or animals born with extra limbs, and metaphorically of people incapable of virtuous activity or

³³ Too much heat from the semen will dry up the matter supplied by the female, and if the semen is not hot enough it will not solidify the matter and form the fetus. It is vital heat that concocts semen and *catamenia* from the blood; because of the female’s lack of vital heat, the blood cannot be sufficiently rarified to form semen and it becomes *catamenia*, pure blood that has been rarified to become matter for conception. “The opposite of the male is the female, which is female in virtue of its inability to effect concoction [of semen] and of the coldness of its bloodlike nourishment,” GA 766b 19-20; cf. 768a 8f., 28f.

³⁴ The second factor of sexual differentiation in conception is the material supplied by the female. If the *catamenia* is too watery, it may be indisposed to receive the male form in that the male form may not be able to heat it properly; the resulting conception would be female. The third factor is the influence of weather and the heavenly bodies. The orbit of the planets and the seasonal changes of temperature were thought to affect generation by changing the temperature of the male and female principles, which therefore affected whether or not a conception would take place, and sexual variety itself. Thomas denies the objection that the generation of woman is always the result of a defect of the male or female principles. “The generation of woman is not occasioned either by a defect of the active force or by inept matter, as the objection proposes; but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause,” for example, the weather and the movement of the heavenly bodies. (ST I.99.2 ad 2) A cold temperature favors the conception of females, and a hot temperature the conception of males.

³⁵ ST I. 92.1 ad 1

³⁶ Aristotle, *On the Generation of Animals*, trans. A.L. Peck, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1953, Book II.3, 737a. See Peck’s note on p. 174 for the range of translation options.

of stunted moral development.³⁷ It would be a mistake, however, to conclude too hastily from this that “the female is, as it were, a *peperomenon* male” means simply that every female is simply a deformed or mutilated instance of the species, as a mistake of nature. In the first place, Aristotle’s very notion of Nature rules out such an interpretation. For Aristotle, there is even more beauty and purpose in the works of Nature than in human art,³⁸ and what happens always or for the most part cannot be a mistake of Nature. The conception of female animals quite obviously falls into this category. Furthermore, as Nolan has pointed out, *peperomenon* and related words do not always signify for Aristotle a deformity or lack that makes a given individual mutilated or defective. In certain cases (Aristotle points to the ears of seals and the jaws of crocodiles), a certain physiology that is *peperomenon* with respect to the general type may be greatly to the animal’s advantage. Thus the auditory passages of the seal are *peperomenon* in comparison with the ears of other quadrupeds but this is not a defect for the seal but rather Nature’s clever work for the seal’s greater advantage.³⁹ Now female animals are included in the intention of nature for the purpose of generation--“this indeed is a necessity required by Nature, since the race of creatures which are separated into male and female has got to be kept in being...female offspring must of necessity be produced by animals.”⁴⁰ There

³⁷ cf. Nolan, “Woman in Aristotle and Aquinas,” 23.

³⁸ PA 641 b 11; cf. Peck *Generation of Animals* xlvii

³⁹ Aristotle describes the auditory passages of seals as *peperomenon* in comparison with the ears of live-bearing quadruped animals, yet points out that this construction is actually a help rather than a hindrance. “Nature has brought off a clever piece of work in the seal which....possesses no ears but only passages. The reason for this is that it spends its life in a fluid medium. The ear is a part of the body which is an addition made to the passages in order to safeguard the movement of the air which comes from a distance, and therefore it is of no use to the seal; indeed it would actually be a hindrance rather than a help, because it would act as a receptacle for a large volume of water.” Aristotle, GA IV.3.769b31, quoted in Nolan “Woman in Aristotle and Aquinas” 24-25. Also, Aristotle uses the words *anapria* (a mutilated state, related to *peperomenon*) and *anapalin* (upside-down) to describe the tongue and jaws of the crocodile in a way that is similar to his use of *peperomenon* for the seal. He mistakenly describes the upper jaw of the crocodile as jointed and the tongue as unusually small, and hence these features are *anapalin* and *anapria* respectively, but shows that they are not defects but are rather to the crocodile’s advantage by the construction of Nature. Cf. Nolan, “Woman in Aristotle and Aquinas,” 26-27.

⁴⁰ Aristotle, GA 767b 10-12

remains a certain dichotomy, however. The male is better and more divine than the female, since he imparts the active principle of the soul to the offspring.⁴¹ Thomas will claim that as the agent is more perfect than the patient, and the end more perfect than that which is ordained to the end, so the male is more perfect than the female.⁴²

The root of *occasionatus* in the Latin rendering *Femina est mas occasionatus* of Aristotle's phrase is *occasio*, "occasion, happening, accident." *Occasionatus* is the passive participle of the verb *occasionare*, a word that is unattested in classical Latin but used by Thomas to signify "to occasion, cause accidentally, induce."⁴³ In the context of music, the term "accidental" in English captures well the sense of *occasionatus*. An accidental is a note in a piece of music which is not included in the scale of notes in the key signature, or, alternately, the accidentals are the symbols of a sharp, a flat, or a natural used to indicate these notes. Accidentals are intended by the composer and are integral to the purpose and overall beauty of the phrases, and to the mood and complexity of the whole. Now when Thomas uses the word *occasionatus*, he refers to an occurrence which is outside the intention of the agent, and this is the sense in which we must read "*per respectum ad naturam particularem, femina est aliquid deficiens et occasionatum*"—with respect to the particular nature, woman is something deficient and *occasionatus*.⁴⁴ This affirmation corresponds to an accidental note in music being outside the key signature of the piece. Thomas will also say that woman is according to the intention of nature and of nature's Creator: "*Sed per comparationem ad naturam universalem femina non est aliquid occasionatum, sed est de intentione naturae ad opus generationis ordinata. Intentio*

⁴¹ GA 732a 9f

⁴² cf. *Super I ad Corinthios* XI. Lecture 3, n. 611

⁴³ "Occasiono," *A Latin-English Dictionary of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Roy J. Defarrari. Daughters of St Paul: Boston, 1986. Also cf. the Perseus database, which has no entry either for "occasionatus" or "occasionare."

⁴⁴ ST.I.92.1, obj 1, ad 1

autem naturae universalis dependet ex Deo, qui est universalis auctor naturae.”⁴⁵ With regard to universal nature, woman is not something *occasionatus*, but is ordered to the work of generation from the intention of nature. However, the intention of universal nature depends upon God, who is the author of universal nature. This affirmation corresponds to an accidental note being in a piece of music for the sake of the beauty of the whole through the genius of the composer.

Now “particular nature” means “a thing’s own power of action and self-preservation.”⁴⁶ Thomas distinguishes it from universal nature, which is an “active force in some universal principle of nature.”⁴⁷ Here “particular nature” could be read as the particular nature of a concrete, individual woman, but it is more likely that Thomas is here referring to the particular nature of the semen itself. He says in the same context *Summa Contra Gentiles*: “the generation of a female is apart from the intention of a *particular nature*, that is, of the *power which is in this semen*.”⁴⁸ That is, the conception of a female implies that the semen’s own active power and self-preservation has been frustrated; the generation of a female is outside the natural intention of the male principle and is thus accidental with respect to the particular nature of the semen. Pia de Solenni argues that the fact that Thomas brings up Aristotle’s maxim in an objection is a sufficient indication that he is in disagreement with the Philosopher. The objection in question concerns whether or not woman should have been made in the first production of things (i.e. creation). It reads: “It would seem that the woman should not have been made in the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 3), that “*femina est mas occasionatus*” But nothing *occasionatum et deficiens* should have been in the first production of

⁴⁵ ST I. 92.1 ad 1

⁴⁶ ST I-II.85.6

⁴⁷ ST I-II.85.6

⁴⁸ SCG III.94.11. Joseph Hartel (op. cit.) and Michael Nolan (“What Aquinas Never Said About Women”) drew my attention to this point.

things. Therefore woman should not have been made at that first production.”⁴⁹ De Solenni claims that “Often, Aquinas has been represented as being a misogynist who claimed that woman was a misbegotten man. Well, he does say this in a few places, but they are all objections, meaning that they are not his own view. Rather they are the position of the objector.”⁵⁰ In her dissertation, de Solenni makes the same claim: “Aquinas surprisingly assigns Aristotle the role of an objector. Throughout most of Aquinas’ writings, Aristotle is heralded as an authority, the Philosopher par excellence; but, in this question, Aquinas argues against Aristotle’s position.”⁵¹ This assessment of Thomas’ use of authorities does not accord with his use of objections in general nor in the article in question. First, with regard to objections in general, it is not at all surprising for Aristotle to appear in an objection; Aristotle appears in countless objections, as does Scripture in both the Old and New Testaments, Augustine and the Church Fathers, magisterial pronouncements, etc. Being in an objection does not make a text or a thinker an objector; the text is cited precisely as having some degree of authority, though the degree of authority varies according to the text (the highest authority is Scripture, followed by ecclesial legislation, Church Fathers, theologians, profane philosophers etc.). It is almost never the case that Thomas will disagree with the author or text quoted in his objections; what he disagrees with are the conclusions improperly drawn from the authorities he quotes. This is precisely what Thomas is doing in this article, which leads to the second point. In his response, Thomas denies the false conclusion that woman ought not to have been created. He affirms that woman ought to have been created, but without absolutely denying *femina est mas occasionatus*. Quite the contrary: Thomas explicitly confirms the principle in his response, albeit in a qualified sense:

“*[P]er respectum ad naturam particularem, femina est aliquid deficiens et occasionatum... Sed*

⁴⁹ ST I.92.1 obj 1

⁵⁰ Zenit interview with Pia de Solenni, <http://www.catholiceducation.org/articles/feminism/fe0022.html>

⁵¹ *Woman as Imago Dei*, p. 100

per comparationem ad naturam universalem, femina non est aliquid occasionatum—With respect to particular nature, woman is something deficient and *occasionatum*...But in comparison to universal nature, woman is not something *occasionatum*.” Thomas deals with Aristotle’s principle with a distinction, not a denial. De Solenni’s claim does not stand up to close scrutiny of Thomas’ use of authority in the *Summa Theologiae* in general, nor with his use of his text of Aristotle’s *De Generatione Animalium* in this particular article. What it means to be *occasionatus* with respect to particular nature yet not so with regard to universal nature will be addressed next.

Michael Nolan has argued that not only does Thomas not assert *femina est mas occasionatus*, he actually denies it repeatedly. This is accurate only when qualified, which Nolan does when he says that Thomas “attempts to set Aristotle’s dictum in its context and to show that it has a strictly limited application which does not imply that women are defective.”⁵² Thomas is indeed quick to point out that as far as universal nature is concerned, woman is by no means defective or *occasionatus*, but rather she is according to the intention of nature and of nature’s Creator: “*Sed per comparationem ad naturam universalem femina non est aliquid occasionatum, sed est de intentione naturae ad opus generationis ordinata. Intentio autem naturae universalis dependet ex Deo, qui est universalis auctor naturae.*”⁵³ With regard to universal nature, woman is not something *occasionatus*, but is ordered to the work of generation from the intention of nature. However, the intention of universal nature depends upon God, who is the author of universal nature. Woman, Thomas affirms, is not merely the accidental byproduct of a frustrated generation process, but she is directly willed by God for the perfection of universal nature. Thomas’ treatment of the creation of woman underlines that woman, far from being a mistake or

⁵² Michael Nolan, “What Aquinas Never Said About Women.”

⁵³ ST I. 92.1 ad 1

unintended defect of nature, is positively intended by the Creator as necessary for the perfection of the human species.⁵⁴ When Thomas affirms *femina est mas occasionatus* with regard to particular nature, he is indeed just as quick to affirm that *femina non est aliquid occasionatum* with regard to universal nature. In doing so he is not departing from Aristotle, as some have claimed⁵⁵, but only following him, as Nolan shows: “the belief that Nature acts for a purpose and constantly seeks to achieve ‘that which is better’ ...he sets down as a fundamental principle of his natural philosophy that in the works of nature purpose and not accident is predominant.”⁵⁶

However, Nolan’s claim that the *occasionatus per respectum ad natura particulara* has a strictly limited application which does not imply that women are defective is difficult to sustain in light of the consistency with which Thomas does claim, in no uncertain terms and in a variety of contexts that the woman is less noble and weaker (*debilior*) than man, from a defect of reason (*ex defectu rationis*). This relative weakness extends to woman even in her intellectual and moral dimensions, that is, to woman’s reason in its relation to the will and the passions. This will be the subject taken up next.

The relative dignity of man and woman and the inferiority of woman’s reason

Thomas is not at all shy about using the language of relative dignity and perfection to speak of the differences between man and woman. Regarding creation, he writes that “Woman

⁵⁴ “Nothing belonging to the completeness of human nature would have been lacking in the state of innocence. And as different grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also diversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature. Therefore in the state of innocence, both sexes would have been begotten,” ST I.99.2 sed contra. Thomas holds that the body of the first woman was created immediately by God from the rib of the man, as the body of the first man was created immediately by God from the slime of the earth (ST I.92.4). Furthermore, he holds that in the state of innocence, not only would there have been generation by coition, but also that the parents by willing it would have been able to cause the sex of the child and that men and women would have been born in equal numbers (ST I.99.2 ad 2)

⁵⁵ Popik seems to hold that the particular nature/universal nature distinction originated with St. Thomas to save Aristotle’s account of the generation process while rejecting Aristotle’s supposed conclusion that women are “unintended to exist and a mistake,” “Philosophy of Woman of St. Thomas Aquinas,” Part I, 28-29

⁵⁶ “Woman in Aristotle and Aquinas,” 29; cf. op. cit. 22-31, Aristotle GA II.6.743a20-744b16, V.8.788b20.

was made in paradise, not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed,” namely the dignity of the man.⁵⁷ “The male sex is nobler than the female, and so [Christ] assumed human nature in the male sex. Lest however the feminine sex be despised, it was fitting that he took flesh from a woman.”⁵⁸ Speaking of the Old Testament sacrificial system, Thomas explains that “Because the holocaust was the most perfect kind of sacrifice, therefore none but a male was offered for a holocaust: because the female is an imperfect animal.”⁵⁹ All things being equal, one ought to love one’s father more than one’s mother because the father is one’s principle in a more excellent way than the mother is.⁶⁰ The reason that women cannot receive the sacrament of Orders is that “in the feminine sex eminence of degree cannot be signified, because woman is in a state of subjection.”⁶¹

Beginning with the order of creation, Thomas argues that woman is *debilior* simply not with respect to bodily strength, which would be uncontroversial enough, but precisely in respect of what is most essential to the dignity of human nature: the faculty of reason. The defect of reason (*defectu rationis*)⁶² in woman translates in the practical spheres of conjugal, political, and ecclesial life into her natural subjection to man, as it is proper to the wiser to rule and proper to

⁵⁷ ST I. 102. 4 ad 3

⁵⁸ ST III.31a 4 ad 1. *Sexus masculinus est nobilior quam femineus, ideo humanam naturam in masculino sexu assumpsit. Ne tamen sexus femininus contemneretur, congruum fuit ut carnem assumeret de femina. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone Christiano, nolite vos ipsos contemnere, viri, filius Dei virum suscepit. Nolite vos ipsas contemnere, feminae, filius Dei natus est ex femina.*

⁵⁹ ST I-II.102.3 ad 9

⁶⁰ “In making such comparisons as this, we must take the answer in the strict sense, so that the present question is whether the father as father, ought to be loved more than the mother as mother. The reason is that virtue and vice may make such a difference in such like matters, that friendship may be diminished or destroyed, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. viii, 7). Hence Ambrose [Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: ‘Good servants should be preferred to wicked children.’ Strictly speaking, however, the father should be loved more than the mother. For father and mother are loved as principles of our natural origin. Now the father is principle in a more excellent way than the mother, because he is the active principle, while the mother is a passive and material principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the father is to be loved more.” ST II-II.26.10

⁶¹ “*Cum ergo in sexu femineo non possit significari aliqua eminentia gradus, quia mulier statum subjectionis habet; ideo non potest ordinis sacramentum suscipere,*” *Super Sent.*, lib. 4 d. 25 q. 2 a. 1 qc. 1 co

⁶² *Super I Tim.*, cap. 2 l. 3

the less wise to be ruled. In his commentary on 1 Timothy 2, Thomas claims that women are in possession of reason to a lesser degree than men no less than five times. For example: “*Quod sicut mulieres sunt mollioris corporis quam viri, ita et debilioris rationis*”—as women are more delicate of body than men, so they are weaker with respect to reason.⁶³ Regarding women’s silence, learning, and subjection in the churches, Thomas assigns the reason as “*scilicet ex defectu rationis in eis*”—clearly from a defect of reason in them.⁶⁴ Treating the original sin of the first parents in the *Compendium Theologiae*, he states that the devil “sought to lead man astray from the straight path of justice, by attacking him on his weaker side; that is, he tempted the woman, in whom the gift of light or wisdom shone with a lesser brilliance (*aggrediens hominem ex parte debiliori, tentans feminam, in qua minus vigeat sapientiae donum vel lumen*).”⁶⁵ Reformulations of the same basic claim that women are *debilior* in reason with respect to men are found across works and from every period of his active career.⁶⁶

In order to explore the anthropological principles which underlay these puzzling assertions, we turn again to Joseph Hartel’s thorough exposition of Thomas’ use of Aristotelian

⁶³ *Super 1 Tim.*, Cap. 2 Lectio 2

⁶⁴ *Super 1 Timothy*, Cap. 2 Lectio 3. Other formulations of the same principle in this section of his commentary: “*Quia mulieres deficiunt a ratione, requirit ab eis ornatum*,” “*Quia enim in mulieribus ratio est debilis*” (Cap. 2 Lect.2). Regarding women: “*quia eorum qui deficiunt ratione proprium est addiscere*,” and in explanation of why men and women are to teach in the churches: “*quia naturale est quod anima dominetur corpori, et ratio viribus inferioribus. Et ideo, sicut philosophus docet, quandocumque aliqua duo ad invicem sic se habent, sicut anima ad corpus, et ratio ad sensualitatem, naturale dominium est eius qui abundat ratione, et illud est principans, aliud autem est subditum, quod scilicet deficit ratione*” (Cap. 2 Lect. 3).

⁶⁵ CT 189. Latin text is from <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/ott1185.html>. English text is from *Aquinas’ Shorter Summa: Saint Thomas’ Own Concise Version of His Summa Theologica*, trans. Cyril Vollert, SJ, Sophia Institute Press: Manchester, 2002. Cf. also *Super Sent.*, lib. 2 d. 22 q. 1 a. 3 ad 2.

⁶⁶ For example, ST I. 92. 1 ad 2, regarding the “natural subjection of woman to man”: “Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and this kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of subjection which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this kind of subjection existed even before sin. For good order would have been wanting in the human family *si quidam per alios sapientiores gubernati non fuissent* [if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves]. *Et sic ex tali subiectione naturaliter femina subiecta est viro, quia naturaliter in homine magis abundat discretio rationis*. [So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates.]” “*Debilis mulieris*,” *Super Sent.*, lib. 2 d. 22 q. 1 a. 3 ad 2. Cf. SCG III.123.3.

biology. The influence of the heavenly bodies, the composition of the elements in the *catamenia* and the absence of the requisite proportion of vital heat that result in a female conception also cause the female body to have a weaker temperament or disposition of the body than its male counterpart.⁶⁷ This has an effect on the passions, which are the operations of the sensitive power which depend on the proper functioning of the material organs, and which, therefore, are affected by the disposition of the body. This in turn has an effect on the function of reason.

Reason and the passions

For Thomas as for Aristotle, “knowledge begins in the senses,” that is, in sense experience.⁶⁸ The intellect abstracts intelligible forms though sensible forms, in the phantasms which are garnered from sense experience. The disposition of the body affects the mind’s ability to engage in its acts of apprehension, deliberation and judgment: most people would not perform better on the LSAT being drunk or very sleepy. A person cannot exercise her reason at all as long as she is asleep, or in a delirium or a coma. The keenness of the inner and outer senses and the quantity and quality of sense experience also affect cognition because they affect the number and quality of the phantasms. If plain common sense were not enough, studies of the effects of extreme and less extreme forms of sense experiential deprivation confirm the Aristotelian/Thomistic principle that there is a relation between sense experience on the one hand and cognition and social living on the other.⁶⁹ The proper operation of reason depends, therefore, on the proper operation of the sensitive powers of apprehension and their exposure to sense

⁶⁷ ST II-II.156.1 ad 1

⁶⁸ ST I. 12.12

⁶⁹ The social, cognitive, and linguistic impairments of children deprived of sense experience have been studied, as in the cases of the so-called “feral children.” Cf. Armando R. Favazza, “Feral and isolated children,” *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 50(1): 1977, 105–111; Peter E. Jones, “Contradictions and Unanswered Questions in the Genie Case: A Fresh Look at the Linguistic Evidence,” *Language & Communication* 15(3):1995, 261-280

experience. The whole soul of man is rational, either essentially in the case of the intellect and will, or by participation in the case of the sensitive appetites. The passions are movements of the sensitive appetite in response to things perceived by the senses. The passions can indirectly affect the acts of the practical reason, that is, reason as it judges the goodness of things and commands the will to its act of choosing.⁷⁰

Now the actual movement of the sensitive appetite can be related to reason in several ways and contribute to the moral goodness or evil of an act. Of themselves the passions do not have moral value, not even the most intense passions; anger is not praised or blamed because it is anger but because of what the anger is about (its object). Morality enters the scene when reason enters the scene, because the passions are the subjects of virtue or vice only insofar as they participate in reason.⁷¹ Passion can precede reason's act of judgment, or the act of reason can precede the passion. Passions which precede reason can cloud the judgment of reason and therefore decrease the moral character of the act: they make a good action less good and an evil action less evil. Passions which follow upon the judgment of reason, on the other hand, increase the moral character of an act, making a virtuous action better or an evil action more evil. It is also the case, however, that intense passions that are in accord with reason may be an important

⁷⁰ A passion can antecedently obscure the judgment of reason, so that a person acts more from passion and less from the judgment of reason. Consequently, passions can also accompany and follow moral acts; a man may, by the judgment of reason, allow himself to be affected by a passion in order that he may act more promptly by the cooperation of the sensitive appetite, and an intense movement in the higher part of the soul will be accompanied by a corresponding movement in the lower part, i.e., the passions of the sensitive part. (ST I-II.24.3 ad 1)

⁷¹ Following Aristotle, Thomas lists these passions as love, hatred, desire, aversion, joy/delight, sorrow, hope, despair, fear, daring, anger. (ST I-II.23.2, 3). Whereas reason rules the body with a "despotic rule," it rules the sensitive appetite "politically," and therefore even the sensitive powers participate to a degree in reason (ST I-II.17.7; I-II.58.3) The passions are not detached from the operation of reason, but rather are ordered to their proper activity by reason, and are therefore the real subjects of virtue. Virtue properly speaking is the perfection of the powers of soul which renders the possessor good and his act good likewise (ST I-II.55.3, cf. art. 4 of the same article). Virtue is reason as directing the powers of the soul to their proper operation and attain their proper object. Thus the virtuous life is not the absence of passion but rather the proper ordering of the passions to the good determined by reason. When the passions are habitually formed by reason to seek the good, even the spontaneous movements of passion are according as reason would direct and virtuous acts are easy, delightful, and pleasant. Virtue is a kind of second nature.

spur for a person to do what virtue requires, even without or against the judgment of reason. This is an important factor when the reason is in error; thus a man may have made a practical judgment that partial-birth abortion is morally acceptable, and yet he may still experience repugnance when considering the hideousness of the process. On the other side, at times a mother's affectionate tenderness can move her to caress and kiss her child without her practical reason entering into the act or even needing to, as when her toddler falls and she rushes to comfort him. Passions in accord with reason are good, even when they precede the judgment of reason; the passions which are elicited by right reason are even better. On Thomas' account, it is better to do a virtuous act with passion, and with the most intense passion, when this passion follows upon the judgment of reason, than to do the same good act with less passion or none at all.⁷² This is why the measure of a virtuous act is not how difficult it is but rather how connatural it is, how readily the whole soul falls in with the good. Thus the more virtuous a person is, the more spontaneous he is free to be.

For Thomas, that woman is naturally of weaker bodily temperament than man entails that the relation of the passions to reason is naturally less perfect in women than in men. They are less apt for the heights of intellectual activity; thus women and simple or uneducated folk have a "defect of contemplation," and the evidence given at a trial may be rejected without any fault on the part of the witness on account of "a defect in the reason, as in the case of children, imbeciles and women."⁷³ It is worth quoting him at some length on the point of woman's intellectual and moral inferiority to man:

⁷² While acting from passion decreases the moral goodness of an act, since it is more praiseworthy to act from the judgment of reason alone, acting with passion increases the moral goodness of a good act, as it contributes to the prompt and complete execution of the good and as its intensity reflects the intensity of the rational desire for the good. In this case, the more passion with which a morally good act is performed, the more praiseworthy the act will be (ST I-II.24.3 ad 1).

⁷³ ST II-II.82.3 arg. 3; ST II-II.70.3

Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak temperament, the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she holds to it weakly; although in rare cases the opposite occurs, according to Proverbs 31:10, "Who shall find a valiant woman?" And since small and weak things "are accounted as though they were not" [Aristotle, Phys. ii, 5] the Philosopher speaks of women as though they had not the firm judgment of reason, although the contrary happens in some women. Hence he states that "we do not describe women as being continent, because they are vacillating" through being unstable of reason, and "are easily led" so that they follow their passions readily.⁷⁴

Thus for Thomas, reason is unstable in women. They are led more by their passions than their reason on account of the weak temperament of their body. This is not to deny that men are ever led by their passions, nor to deny that women are ever led by reason. It is only to say that in woman, the sensitive powers are stronger with respect to reason than they are in men. It may be objected that if woman's bodily temperament is weaker than man's, and if the passions are in part the operation of the body, would it not follow that woman's passions are weaker and more feeble than those of man, whose bodily temperament is more robust? Why then is the weakness assigned to woman's reason and not to her passions? The ease with which Thomas answers that women more easily fall into concupiscence than men⁷⁵, that they are vacillating and they are more easily led than men by their passions seems to suggest not so much an argument from theology or even biology but rather an argument from experience, either his own or the inherited cultural experience of his day, or a combination of the two. In general, Thomas states that the soul is weak when the sensitive passions move too strongly. "Just as in the body the stronger the movement against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the stronger the movement of passion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness of the soul."⁷⁶

The assertion of woman's relative moral weakness recurs in Thomas' commentary on Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*, and in his consideration of the duties of parents in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. Aristotle purposefully distinguishes the passive role of woman in the act of

⁷⁴ ST II-II.156.1 ad 1.

⁷⁵ ST II-II.149.4, referenced in Hartel, "The Integral Feminism of St. Thomas Aquinas," 11.

⁷⁶ ST I-II.77.3 ad 1

generation from the passivity involved in moral incontinence. For a person to be incontinent is to surrender himself to the tide of the passions against what his reason judges to be truly good and noble. Aristotle is concerned to distinguish incontinence from passivity as such and from an evil natural disposition and from an evil habit and to show that not every case of passivity is a case of incontinence, as not every evil habit or evil natural disposition is a case of incontinence. This is the sense of his remark that “Now those in whom nature is the cause of such a state [of brutishness] no one would call incontinent, any more than one would apply the epithet to women because of the passive part they play in copulation, nor would one apply it to those who are in a morbid condition as a result of habit.”⁷⁷ Aristotle is not drawing a strict parallel between naturally bestial men, men who are bestial from having acquired a disordered habit, and women. Incontinence requires not simply passivity, but to be swayed by passion against the judgment of reason. Thus Aristotle is not so much making an observation about woman’s moral constitution as he is distinguishing one expression of passivity from another.

Thomas in commenting on this passage in Aristotle, however, goes beyond the immediate context of woman’s relative passivity in the act of generation to woman’s moral constitution more generally. He says that in

women,...for the most part, reason flourishes very little because of the imperfect nature of their body. Because of this they do not govern their emotions in the majority of cases by reason but rather are governed by their emotions. Hence wise and brave women are rarely found, and so women cannot be called continent and incontinent without qualification. The same argument seems valid for those who are ill, i.e., have a diseased temperament because of bad habits, which oppresses the judgment of reason after the manner of a perverse nature.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Aristotle, *NE* VII.5, 1148b32-35

⁷⁸ Thomas, *Commentary on NE*, Book VII Lect. 5 [1376]. “*Et ponit exemplum de mulieribus in quibus, ut in pluribus, modicum viget ratio propter imperfectionem corporalis naturae. Et ideo, ut in pluribus, non ducunt affectus suos secundum rationem, sed magis ab affectibus suis ducuntur. Propter quod raro inveniuntur mulieres sapientes et fortes. Et ideo non simpliciter possunt dici continentes vel incontinentes. Et eadem ratio videtur esse de his qui aegrotative se habent, idest qui habent corruptam dispositionem propter malam consuetudinem, quae etiam opprimit iudicium rationis ad modum perversae naturae.*”

Thomas is quite clearly asserting here a moral imperfection of women (“they do not govern their emotions in the majority of cases by reason,” “wise and brave women are rarely found”) following upon an imperfection of reason which is the natural result of an imperfection of body (“reason flourishes very little because of the imperfect nature of their body”). This assertion is not simply by way of a comment upon the present text of Aristotle, since all that Aristotle says of women here is to state “the passive part they play in copulation.” Since Thomas gives substantively the same account of woman’s reason vis-à-vis her passions in the *Summa Theologiae* and in his commentaries on 1 Timothy and 1 Corinthians, it is entirely warranted to read this text of the *Ethics* commentary as an expression of Thomas’ own thought.

Man as Natural Ruler, Woman as Natural subject

The relative strength of the sensitive appetite relative to reason in woman is the theoretical basis of the kind of natural domestic subjection of woman to man Thomas calls subjection in the “economic order.”⁷⁹ Thomas contrasts the natural economic/domestic subjection sharply with the servile subjection of the slave. In a state of servile subjection, a superior makes use of his inferiors for his own benefit. Thomas denies that this servile state is natural to woman as she was created before the Fall or, indeed, to any man: “servile [subjection]...began after sin.”⁸⁰ In the kind of subjection which is natural, a superior governs his inferiors not with a view solely to his own good but primarily with a view to the good of those whom he governs. This second kind of subjection did exist prior to the Fall, because good order among individuals requires an orderer. Now spouses come together not only for the purpose of generation but also “*propter domesticam vitam*”—for domestic life, and their shared life is a

⁷⁹ Pia de Solenni, *Hermeneutic of Aquinas’ Mens*, p. 88.

⁸⁰ ST I.92.1 ad 2

“*socialis coniunctio*.”⁸¹ In this shared domestic life, Thomas concludes that “*naturaliter femina subiecta est viro, quia naturaliter in homine magis abundat discretio rationis*—woman is naturally subject to man, because in man there naturally more abounds the discretion of reason.”⁸²

Pia de Solenni wrongly argues that the *homine* in Question 92 article 1 ought to be understood as referring to mankind generally rather than to man as male. She points out that in the preceding clause the gender-specific words *femina* and *viro* are used and concludes that “he uses the nonexclusive term ‘*homine*’ to speak of a distinction or division (*discretio*) of reckoning, of proportion, or of reason (*rationis*) which abounds to a greater extent (*magis abundat*) in mankind (*homine*).”⁸³ De Solenni seems to be claiming that Thomas is only saying here, as he does elsewhere, that differences and inequalities would have existed before the fall, that virtue, beauty, and other perfections would not have been poured out in the same way or in the same proportions to each human being, without, however, implying any defect in soul or in body in those who are surpassed.⁸⁴ Thomas takes a further step in article 1 of Question 92, however. He seems to be genuinely affirming that reason abounds more in men generally than women generally, even if the converse occurs in rare cases. Even if his use of *homine* here makes it less clear that it is *viro* in whom reason more abounds, he has just stated that *femina* is naturally subject to *viro* as those who are less wise are governed by those who are wiser. Even if one granted, as I do not, that *homine* here is used generally and broadly of “mankind,” the other above-cited passages from the *Summa Theologiae*, the commentary on 1 Timothy and the *Compendium Theologiae* which state in no uncertain terms that woman as *femina* is weaker (or

⁸¹ ST I.92.2, 3

⁸² ST I.92.1 ad 2.

⁸³ de Solenni, 88

⁸⁴ ST I.96.3

deficient, or defective) in reason and wisdom than man as *viro*, or that she is “naturally of less strength and dignity than man.”

The unmistakable assertion of woman’s inferior *ratio* comes up in the commentaries on the *Politics* and *Nichomachean Ethics* when Aristotle treats conjugal life. When pressed to answer why it is that men rule over slaves, women, and children when all have the same powers of the soul and all may have the virtues, Aristotle answers that it is on the basis of the different functioning of reason in them that slaves, children, and women are suited to being ruled:

almost all things rule and are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule differs;--the freeman rules over the slave after another manner from that in which the male rules over the female, or the man over the child; although the parts of the soul are present in all of them, they are present in different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature.⁸⁵

As we have seen before, the most important determinant of the ruler’s authority is the discretion of reason. Woman is clearly associated here with a reason that functions without authority, and Thomas’ comments on this passage that “the female, since she is free, has the power of deliberating, although her deliberation is weak. This is because her reason, because of the tenderness of her nature, weakly adheres to reason’s decision and is quickly drawn away from it because of particular emotions (e.g. desire, anger, fear, or such like).”⁸⁶ Both Aristotle and Thomas, furthermore, set up a parallel between three analogous pairs: higher reason and lower reason, male and female, ruling and being ruled. Higher reason corresponds to the male; the

⁸⁵ *Politics* I.13, 1260a4-24. Cf. also “And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful...Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind” (*Politics* I. 5, 1254b5-15). “A husband and father, we saw, rules over wife and children, both free, but the rule differs, the rule over his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule. For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and more immature...” (*Politics* I.12, 1259a39ff). Cf. also *NE* VIII.10 1160b32-1161a 4

⁸⁶ *Comm. on Pol.* I.10 n. 7.

lower parts of the soul correspond to female. Good order is when the higher powers of reason rule the lower powers of the soul, which corresponds to the rule of male over female.⁸⁷

Thomas and Aristotle ascribe different characteristic virtues to men and women based on the disparity in their deliberative faculties. Aristotle says that “Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them; but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and the justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying.”⁸⁸ “All classes must be deemed to have their special attributes; as the poet says of women, ‘Silence is a woman’s glory,’ but this is not equally the glory of man...”⁸⁹ Thomas reveals that he is not only presenting the view of Aristotle, but also his own view, by supplementing Aristotle’s claim with a quotation of St. Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians. He writes:

For it belongs to the character and worthiness of women to be silent, since it proceeds from the modesty due them. But silence does not belong to the character of men. Rather, it belongs to their character that they speak when it is fitting. And so also St. Paul in 1 Cor 14:34-5 warns women to be silent in the churches and ask their husbands at home if they wish to learn anything.⁹⁰

As in his commentary on 1 Timothy 2 quoted above, Thomas draws a causal line from woman’s inferior power of reasoning vis-à-vis her emotions to her characteristic virtue of silence and the necessity of her being ruled by a man for her own good. As Popik notes, woman’s subjection to man is natural not only because every society needs a ruler in order to be well-ordered “but also

⁸⁷ Thomas is also aware that St. Augustine draws the same parallel (cf. *De Trinitate* XII.3, 7, 10, 13; *Tract. in Io. cap. iv*) and Thomas draws upon his thought on this question in various contexts. He draws upon *De Trinitate* XII in a discussion of higher and lower reason in *DV* 15.art 4 ad 7 and in his explication of 1 Cor 11, (Lecture I.590, Lect.III.614). As Popik points out, Thomas makes use of this analogy and quotes Augustine’s use of it also in his *Commentary on St. John’s Gospel*, “explaining that Jesus’ saying to the Samaritan woman at the well ‘Go and fetch your husband’ is a reference to the woman’s higher reason and a figurative way of saying ‘Fetch your higher reasoning powers,’” Popik “The Philosophy of Woman of St. Thomas Aquinas,” Part I, 39 (cf. Thomas In Io. Ev. Exp. Iv.2.6.590, Augustine *Tractates on John*, Tract. XV.19) In *Super 1 Tim*, cap. 2 lect. 3 Thomas makes use of the parallel without reference to either, although it is more likely that has St. Augustine in mind, since he refers to it as a “figure.”

⁸⁸ *Politics* I.13, 1260a4-24

⁸⁹ *Politics* 1260a28-30

⁹⁰ *Comm. Pol.* I.13

because it is required by the nature of woman herself, by her inferiority to the man who is naturally fitted to provide her with the guidance and direction she needs.”⁹¹ For this reason, women cannot teach publicly, but they may teach privately and indeed, they have an obligation to do so.⁹² An essential reason why marriage is indissoluble for Thomas is that “the female in the human species is not at all able to take care of the upbringing of offspring by herself, since the needs of human life demand many things which cannot be provided by one person alone.”⁹³ This upbringing is not simply a matter of material needs, but the education of the soul, and “a woman alone is not adequate to this task; rather, this demands the work of a husband, in whom reason is more developed for giving instruction and strength is more available for giving punishment.”⁹⁴

It is quite clear from these texts that both Aristotle and Thomas are committed to a view of reason in men and women according to which the faculty of reason in man is more perfect and which translates into a disparity in the moral, conjugal, and political orders. For Aristotle, husband and wife have distinct spheres of authority in the family, and the husband is ultimately

⁹¹ Popik, Part II 46.

⁹² Cf. ST II-II.177.2c, ad 1

⁹³ SCG III.122.6

⁹⁴ SCG III.122.8. It should be noted in connection with the distinct tasks of mothers and fathers that certain biological burdens are unequally borne by men and women, and accordingly certain limitations and perfections may be bound up with the activities of motherhood and fatherhood, for the common good of the family and of the human race as a whole. Thus a woman may have to sacrifice time given to higher education or to her career in order to care for her family or vice versa, and a man may have to sacrifice time with his family in order to support his family or vice versa. Whether it is just for social and economic structures to impose particular sacrifices unequally on men and women is not a question that this study can begin to address. Fortunately for the men and women of every age for whom education and choice of career is a privilege for the elite, the development of the highest reasoning faculties in St. Thomas’ sense is primarily a matter of cultivating of the contemplative and moral virtues, not to mention faith, hope, and charity, and not intrinsically dependent upon earning academic degrees or having a satisfying professional career, as good as these things are. Hence for Thomas the little old woman with faith in Christ is wiser in the ways of God than all the philosophers (“*Et hoc patet, quia nullus philosophorum ante adventum Christi cum toto conatu suo potuit tantum scire de Deo et de necessariis ad vitam aeternam, quantum post adventum Christi scit una vetula per fidem,*” *Exp. in Symbolum Apostolorum*, Prooemium). The specific limitations and perfections of motherhood may include woman’s heightened affective sensibility, and be related to the distinctiveness of motherhood as a reality that develops inside of a woman, whereas fatherhood is intrinsically exterior to a man. This question and the related question of the distinctiveness of reason in men and women merit being the subject of their own study.

the superior of the wife.⁹⁵ He parallels the friendship of brothers with a timocratic form of government, “for they are equals,” and he contrasts it with the friendship of husband and wife, paralleling the latter with aristocracy, in which the one who is superior rules: “The association of man and wife seems to be aristocratic; for the man rules in accordance with his worth, and in those matters in which a man should rule, but the matters that befit a woman he hands over to her.”⁹⁶ If Aristotle proposes a disparity in the friendship between husband and wife, such is rooted in a profound understanding of an even greater natural affinity between man and woman. Friendship between man and woman exists by nature, as men and women form couples even more readily than they found cities; the friendship between husband and wife can be on all possible levels of friendship, namely those of pleasure, utility and virtue.⁹⁷ Thomas echoes these ideas in his commentary on the *NE* and adds in another place that the friendship of husband and wife is the greatest of friendships.⁹⁸ The natural friendship between husband and wife remains a friendship of inequality, however, not only because different gifts are brought to the relationship but also because of the unequal nobility of man and woman. De Solenni misses the mark when she states that “Aquinas says that there should be no natural subjection between spouses, that is they should be innately equal,” and that in the “friendship between man and woman, [what] Aquinas clearly has in mind is a friendship of equals.”⁹⁹ Thomas in fact reaffirms Aristotle’s idea of the unequal friendship of husband and wife (in contrast to the equal and democratic friendship

⁹⁵ NE VIII.11.1160b32-1161a2; *Politics* I.12.1259a37-b10, I.13.1260a8-15

⁹⁶ NE VIII.11 1160b32-35

⁹⁷ NE VIII.11.1161a19-24; cf. Aquinas, *Comm. In Eth. Nic.* VIII Lect. XI.1723, SCG III.123.6. The poignant beauty of these passages seriously calls into question Sr. Prudence Allen’s strident assertion that the “hostile interaction of opposites [i.e. male and female] in generation” translates into a “battle of the sexes” relationship between men and women and that “Aristotle’s theory of sex polarity, with its inherent antagonism between the sexes, if accepted by society at large, would have a deep psychological effect on the quality of love between mother, father, and child” (*Concept of Woman* Vol. I pp 101-2). NE VIII.12 makes it clear that Aristotle conceives of the society of husband and wife based on virtue the most natural form of friendship for human nature, one which is pleasant and useful; the “bond of union” is strongest where there are children.

⁹⁸ *Comm. In Eth. Nic.* VIII Lect. XI.1723, SCG III.123.6.

⁹⁹ *Aquinas’ Mens* 118

of brothers) in his commentary on Aristotle's *NE*,¹⁰⁰ and he explicitly and repeatedly affirms the natural subjection of wife to husband based upon the disparity in their deliberative faculties, as we have seen.

It is important to note that Thomas does recognize important exceptions to the general moral and intellectual weakness of women, both in the order of nature and of grace. Hence when he discusses women's moral weakness in the *ST* and in the *In Eth. Exp.* he uses such phrases as "for the most part," "in the majority of cases"; and on the contrary, in "rare cases," in "some women," wisdom, valor, and the firm judgment of reason are found, but "rarely."¹⁰¹ Apart from the perfections and handicaps arising from more or less well-balanced physical constitutions, Thomas also recognizes the perfectibility of woman's reason through education and the practice of the virtues.¹⁰² Furthermore, Thomas recognizes that when men abandoned Christ in his passion, women remained constant to Christ because their affections were stronger and more fervent. Their more affective nature gave them the constancy that men lacked.¹⁰³ Popik comments that woman's "greater affective nature then is the cause both of the woman's inferiority in virtue and of her occasional strength in virtue compared with the man."¹⁰⁴

In the order of grace, all bets are off, so to speak. Grace presupposes, builds upon, and perfects nature, but grace also surpasses nature so utterly that the good of grace in one soul is greater than the good of the whole universe.¹⁰⁵ If the difference in natural gifts and dignity is overcome by grace to the extent that the creature on the lowest end of the spectrum of

¹⁰⁰ *Comm. In Eth. Nic.* VIII.Lect XI.1694 expands upon Aristotle somewhat: in "a friendship between a husband and wife...the husband, being more worthy, is placed over the wife; however, the husband does not direct the affairs belonging to the wife." Also cf. the second part of Popik's dissertation "The Philosophy of Woman of St. Thomas Aquinas" in which she explicates in great detail the domestic, social, and political and ecclesial ramifications of woman's natural subjection to man.

¹⁰¹ Thomas, *Commentary on NE*, Book VII Lect. 5 [1376]; *ST II-II*.156.1 ad 1.

¹⁰² *In Io. Exp.* IV.2.10.598

¹⁰³ *In Io Exp.* XIX.4.2438

¹⁰⁴ Popik, Part 1, 50

¹⁰⁵ *SCG*.3.112.2-3, *ST I-II* 113.9 ad 2

intellectual nature is exalted by grace and glory above the highest seraph in the person of the Virgin Mary, then how much more may the accidental imperfections that exist among human beings be transcended and overcome by grace.¹⁰⁶

In a certain sense, the exceptions prove the rule precisely by being exceptions. Those who are committed to upholding the view (at all costs, it seems) that the inferiority of women is foreign to Thomas' anthropology seem systematically to turn a deaf ear to his repeated affirmations of her relative imperfection with respect to the faculty of reason and her moral constitution. While Nolan does demonstrate some awareness of Thomas' claims of woman's inferior body-soul composition when he concedes that Thomas does in one place claim a greater *vigor animi* and *robur corporis* for man than for women, Nolan proposes only a vague solution supported by a quotation not even of Thomas but of Bonaventure.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, it is difficult to conceive a respectable scholarly framework in which to situate Nolan's remark that "Manifestly, Aquinas...den[ies] that woman is defective. There may have been medieval theologians who did not follow [his] lead; if so, one would be glad to have their names, and the references."¹⁰⁸ This statement is frankly bewildering, given the sheer number of formulations Thomas gives to the claim that women suffer a defect of reason (*defectu rationis*), or are weak

¹⁰⁶ Thomas' own practice corresponds perfectly to his theology; his lively devotion to the virgin martyrs and the Blessed Mother is as fitting as it is endearing. As a Dominican Friar, St. Thomas sang the *Salve Regina* every night at Compline and in the choir every with the Friars knelt before the Mother of God at the words *Eia ergo*. As the stories go, he always carried with him a relic of the virgin martyr St. Lucy, to whom he was warmly devoted, and annually feted the student brothers on the feast of St. Agnes. There is no trace of either of prudishness or petty superiority about the Friar of Aquino.

¹⁰⁷ "Aquinas does indeed say that the human beings differ in mind and body, and that man has greater *vigor animi* and *robur corporis* than woman, but perhaps this should be dealt with as one deals with the many assertions in the present culture of, say, the greater emotional maturity of woman. Bonaventure may be wiser when he writes that the union of husband and wife has in it something of the wondrous (*mirabile*), for there man rests in woman and woman is strengthened by man," "Woman in Aristotle and Aquinas" 69-70, quoting Thomas IV *Sent.*, d. 25, q. 2 a. 1, ad 1 and Bonaventure IV *Sent.*, d. 36, a. 2, q. 3, ad 2; II *Sent.* d. 18, a. 1, q. 1.

¹⁰⁸ "Woman in Aristotle and Aquinas," 69.

with respect to reason.¹⁰⁹ It is also bewildering given the scholarly attention that the question had received decades earlier from Popik, Børresen, McGowan, Hartel, and Sr. Prudence Allen. One can only conclude that Nolan either was not familiar with their work, or that he dismisses it out of hand.¹¹⁰ Neither approach does justice to the modern scholars or to the thought of Aristotle and Thomas.

On balance, however, the weight of woman's greatness on Thomas' account far outstrips the weight of her accidental imperfections. To summarize briefly: Thomas and Aristotle are in agreement that sexual differentiation is a necessary perfection of human nature, since it makes generation possible. In answer to the questions of why sexual differentiation implies a greater or lesser participation in the light of reason in one of the sexes, and why man is posited to share in reason to a greater degree, and woman to a lesser degree, the answer given in their biology is that the female is *occasionatus* in that the male principle of generation always aims to reproduce its

¹⁰⁹ "[N]aturale est quod sicut mulieres sunt mollioris corporis quam viri, ita et debilioris rationis. Rationis autem est ordinare actus, et effectus uniuscuiusque rei. Ornatus vero consistit in debita ordinatione et dispositione. Sic in interiori decore nisi sint omnia ordinata ex dispositione per rationem, non habent pulchritudinem spiritualem. Et ideo quia mulieres deficiunt a ratione, requirit ab eis ornatum. Item verecundia est de turpi actu, et ideo est laudabilis in illis qui facile solent declinare in actus turpes, cuiusmodi sunt iuvenes et mulieres, et ideo hoc in eis laudatur, non autem senes et perfecti." (Super 1 Tim. Cap. 2 Lect. 2); "tria ponit eis competere, scilicet taciturnitatem, disciplinam, et subiectionem, quae tria ex una ratione procedunt, scilicet ex defectu rationis in eis, quibus primo indicit silentium... ut discant, quia eorum qui deficiunt ratione proprium est addiscere. I Cor. c. XIV, 35: si quid autem volunt discere, domi viros suos interrogent, et cetera. Viris autem datur quod doceant. Tertio indicit subiectionem, quia naturale est quod anima dominetur corpori, et ratio viribus inferioribus. Et ideo, sicut philosophus docet, quandocumque aliqua duo ad invicem sic se habent, sicut anima ad corpus, et ratio ad sensualitatem, naturale dominium est eius qui abundat ratione, et illud est principans, aliud autem est subditum, quod scilicet deficit ratione" (Super 1 Tim. Cap. 2 Lect. 3); "[E]x tali subiectione naturaliter femina subiecta est viro, quia naturaliter in homine magis abundat discretio rationis" (ST I. 92. 1 ad 2); "Diabolus... aggrediens hominem ex parte debiliori, tentans feminam, in qua minus vigeat sapientiae donum vel lumen" (CT 189).

¹¹⁰ Regarding Nolan's call for references to medieval theologians, cf. Sr. Prudence Allen's *Concept of Woman* Vol. 1, Chapter IV "The Adoption of Aristotelian Arguments," particularly pp 351-407 on Maimonides, St. Albert the Great, and St. Thomas Aquinas, and Chapter V, "The Institutionalization of Aristotle" on St. Bonaventure, pp 426-9, and Giles of Rome, pp 432-5. Cf. also Kristin Mary Popik, "The Philosophy of Woman of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Faith & Reason* IV:4 (1978) and V:1 (1979); Kari Elisabeth Børresen, *Subordination and Equivalence: The Nature and Role of Woman in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Charles H. Talbot, Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981, Part Two: Thomas Aquinas; Richard J. McGowan, *The Imperfection of Woman in Thomas' Doctrine of Woman*, Ann Arbor, University Microfilms International, 1986; Joseph Francis Hartel, *Femina Ut Imago Dei in the Integral Feminism of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Rome, Editrice Pontificia Universita Gregoriana: 1993, Part Three "The Nature of Woman in Particular," and pp 331-5.

own form. Due to the workings of the male and female principles of generation and/or the influence of external natural forces on the conception process, woman as she is conceived is naturally of weaker bodily temperament than man, resulting in an imperfect balance of the senses to reason. Because reason is more stable in man than woman, man is more suited to domestic headship than woman, as the wiser ought to govern the less wise. Woman is not outside the natural intention of universal nature, however; rather, she is directly willed by nature's Creator as a perfection of nature. For Thomas, both men and women are ordered to an even higher life than generation: the life of *intelligere*. The term or end of woman's production is not the *generationis opus* but ultimately the *imago Dei*. By her intelligent nature, woman's dignity is greater than that of all non-intelligent creatures, because God seeks and provides for her for her own sake, whereas God provides for all these other creatures for her sake. Indeed, by grace and glory, one woman is greater than the good of nature in the whole universe.¹¹¹ The supernatural order affords a greater equality between men and women than even the order of nature, because grace surpasses nature entirely.¹¹² It is to the primal ground of woman's dignity that we now turn: the *imago Dei*.

¹¹¹ SCG.3.112.2-3, ST I-II 113.9 ad 2

¹¹² cf. Sr. Prudence Allen, *Concept of Woman*, Vol. I 385ff; Popik, "Philosophy of Woman of St. Thomas" Part I, 24

Part II

The *Imago Dei* in Man and Woman and the *Telos* of Sexual Differentiation

“If we allow that modern biological data and Thomas’s principle regarding material’s reception of form are correct, a different doctrine of woman results. This doctrine of woman, based on Thomas’s philosophical anthropology, holds that woman is neither *occasionata* nor the result of an *impotentia*; that woman is an active *ratio principii*; that woman is not materially deficient; that woman is man’s spiritual equal. In short, if Thomas’ philosophical anthropology and modern biological data are accepted, there does not seem to be a ‘better’ sex: woman is not the *imperfectus sexus*.”¹¹³ This second part will explore further the ramifications of Thomas’ theory of sexual differentiation for his theology of man and woman as *imago Dei*.

At this point in the course of the explanation of Thomas’ doctrine of woman, it may well be objected that if the strength of the passions *against* the order of reason is in direct proportion to the weakness of the mind, on what basis is the first woman, whose passions at her creation were in perfect harmony with reason, supposed to be weak in reason? Thomas’ answer must be sought in his interpretation of two key Genesis texts: “Then God said, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness...So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them” (Gen 1:26a, 27) and “Then the LORD God said, ‘It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a helper fit for him’” (Gen 2:18). Using Scripture to interpret Scripture, Thomas’ main interpretative keys for these texts are 1 Corinthians 11: 3-12, 14: 34-36; Galatians 3:28, and 1 Timothy 2:11-14. Thomas’ treatment of the Genesis texts in light of his interpretation of these texts of St. Paul harmonizes almost seamlessly with Aristotle’s biology, but Thomas’ hermeneutical principles will not allow him to

¹¹³ McGowan 113.

rely primarily upon Aristotle to mine the revealed truth of Genesis. According to his own account of sacred doctrine, philosophical arguments can be useful to make the truth contained in revelation more manifest, but they do not constitute more than probable arguments. Thus even if Aristotle's account of the sexes is consonant with Thomas' interpretation of Genesis--and it will be seen that Thomas holds precisely this--nevertheless Aristotle plays a secondary role here, at least in principle.¹¹⁴

Thomas on the *imago dei* in man and woman

As it was pointed out above, Thomas holds that the image of God is in creatures by virtue of the rational nature. The intellect and will, the powers of knowing and loving, are most to the image of the God whose very nature is to be, to know, and to love. "The intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands and loves Himself."¹¹⁵ Thomas gives a highly nuanced account of "image" and "likeness" to explicate Gen 1:26. He distinguishes between an image and a trace or vestige (*vestigium*)¹¹⁶; he also distinguishes two senses of likeness¹¹⁷. The image versus trace analysis corresponds to rational beings in comparison with irrational. An

¹¹⁴ cf. ST I.1.5 ad 2. Thomas quotes Aristotle in the creation section of the ST 3 times in Q 91 on creation of man's body, and not at all in the question on the creation of man's soul (Q 90) or in the question on the end or term of man's creation being the *imago dei* (Q 93). In Q 92 on the creation of Woman, Thomas quotes *De Generatione*, "*femina est mas occasionatus*" in article 1; in article 2 of the same question he quotes *NE VIII* along with Acts and Eph 5, Gen 2 to explain why woman should have been created; he quotes *Physics* on matter in art .3 ad 1. In Q 94a 4, he quotes Aristotle to support argument that the intellect of man in innocence could not have been deceived. In Q 95 on grace and justice of the first man: art. 3 quotes *NE IV*, and art. 4 quotes *NE II* on the good of virtue being difficult. Q 96 on *quod competeatur homini* in the state of innocence: art. 1 on man ruling irrational creatures quotes *Politics* 1 on an ancillary sub-point; art 4 on man ruling other men quotes *Pol. I* on a ruler being necessary that a multitude may tend to a common good. In Q. 97, on the state of the first man according to the body as to the conservation of the individual: in art. 4 obj 2, he quotes *Metaph. III* where the philosopher laughs at the fables where people eat something and become immortal, and in the body of this article he quotes *De Generatione I*. In Q. 98.1 ad3 Thomas quotes *Pol. II* on private property as avoiding discord. In Q 99 art 2 the first objection quotes *De Gen II femina est mas occasionatus* to argue that women would not have been born in state of innocence, and in reply to the second objection of the same article he quotes "in libro de animalibus" on what kinds of winds contribute to the sex of offspring.

¹¹⁵ ST I.93.4c

¹¹⁶ ST I.93.6

¹¹⁷ ST I.93.9

image is to a trace as a portrait of a man is to his footprint in the mud. Both are derived from the man, but the portrait reflects more of him than his footprint alone. A footprint is an effect the man leaves behind him and an indicator of his presence, but an image is a likeness of a person which represents him as to his species more fully. Hence a large boot-print on the sidewalk indicates that a man has gone by; a picture captured by a security camera indicates that Fred has gone by. All created things are imprinted with a *vestigium* of God; the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God.¹¹⁸ For this reason, man is created to the image of God with respect to the mind alone; as to the body, there is only the representation of God by way of *vestigium*. For Thomas, both *vir* and *mulier* are *ad imaginem Dei*.

A likeness can be a more general category than image, or a more specific one. That is, in the first way, an image can be considered a kind of likeness, where likeness is taken as a general category of representations of things; in the second way, likeness designates some perfection of image.¹¹⁹ In another article in the same question, Thomas explains that there is a threefold perfection of image: that of nature, grace, and glory.¹²⁰ If the intellectual nature images God by knowing and loving God, then the nearer the intellectual creature knowing and loving God approaches God's own knowledge and love of Himself, the more perfectly the creature will image God. There is the natural knowledge and love of God as the first cause that is common to all rational creatures; there is the more perfect knowledge and love of God of the graced intellect and will, which belongs to the just; and finally, there is the perfect knowledge and love of those who are seeing God in the beatific vision, which belongs to those in glory. Thus, men and women will image God most perfectly when the last veil falls and they are beholding Him face-to-face in perfect love.

¹¹⁸ ST I. 93.6c

¹¹⁹ ST I.93.9c

¹²⁰ ST I.93.4c

Incidentally, Thomas' discussion of the threefold perfection of image occurs in the very article in which he has to wrestle with 1 Corinthians 11:7 in his determination to show that woman is to the image of God. An objector proposes that since, according to St. Paul, man is the image of God but woman is the image of man, then it follows that man but not woman is the image of God.¹²¹ Thomas responds with yet another distinction of the idea of the *imago Dei* into primary and secondary meanings.¹²² In the primary sense, the image of God is by reason of the intellectual nature, and hence both man and woman are individually *ad imaginem Dei*:

Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said, "to the image of God He created him," it added, "male and female He created them," not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction.¹²³

Thomas supports this claim by appealing to two passages of St. Paul which he mistakenly but significantly conflates into one continuous passage: "Wherefore the Apostle, after saying, 'According to the image of Him that created him' (Colossians 3:10), added, 'Where there is neither male nor female' (Galatians 3:28)."¹²⁴ In a secondary sense, however, Thomas sees man imaging God in a way that the woman does not: "[f]or man is the principle and the end of woman, as God is the principle and end of every creature."¹²⁵ Thomas explains how man is woman's principle and end by pointing back to 1 Corinthians 11:8-9: "For man was not made from woman, but woman from man. Neither was man created for woman, but woman for man."

¹²¹ ST I.93.4 ad 1. *Unde Gen. I, cum dixisset, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, scilicet hominem, subdidit, masculum et feminam creavit eos, et dixit pluraliter eos, ut Augustinus dicit, ne intelligatur in uno individuo uterque sexus fuisse coniunctus.* This interpretation also contradicts the view proposed by Augustine in a certain context that the man is always *ad imaginem Dei*, but the woman is *ad imaginem Dei* only insofar as she is united with man (cf. De Trin. XII.7.10)

¹²² ST I.93.4 ad 1. The primary and secondary senses of *imago Dei* are related to the three grades of perfection of the image (nature, grace, and glory) in that nature, grace, and glory are perfections of the image in the primary sense. The primary sense refers to man's intellectual nature; grace perfects that nature and glory perfects grace.

¹²³ ST I.93.6 ad 2. Thomas also rejects a proposed reading of Genesis 1:27 which interpreted the singular *illum* in *ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, masculum et feminam creavit eos* to mean that the male and female sexes were originally joined together in one individual, and emphasizes that male and female were separate beings at their creation each *ad imaginem Dei* (ST I.93.4 ad 1).

¹²⁴ ST I. 93.6 ad 2

¹²⁵ ST I.93.4 ad 1

“From man” indicates the principle; “for man” indicates the end. Man is the principle of woman, insofar as he was created first and the Lord formed the woman’s body from his rib. He is her end insofar as woman was created to be a help to man in the work of generation, not qua intellectual creature but qua woman.

Thomas is not slow to perceive the difficulty this proposal raises with respect to his reading of Genesis 1:26-27 in light of “there is no male or female, you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3:28). Though in the *Commentary* on Galatians, Thomas makes no allusion to the *imago Dei* in connection with Gal 3:28¹²⁶, he does connect the two in his 1 Corinthians commentary as an objection to his position that there is a sense in which man and not woman is the image of God. He answers that

man is here called the image of God in a special way, namely, because man is the principle of his entire race, as God is the principle of the entire universe and because from the side of Christ dying on the cross flowed the sacraments of blood and water, from which the Church has been organized. Furthermore, in regard to what is within, man is more especially called the image of God, inasmuch as reason is more vigorous in him.¹²⁷

There are several important layers here. There is the typological signification of the creation of Eve from the side of the man, first with regard to the relation of the world to the Creator and then with regard to the relation of the Church to Christ. Secondly, there is the correspondence between the man and God based what is more interior to man, namely the faculty of reason which Thomas claims is “more vigorous” in the man than in woman.

It must be borne in mind that this secondary sense of *imago Dei* is precisely that: it is secondary both in degree and in signification. The primary signification of the image is the intellectual nature as having a share in the intelligible divine light; the secondary signification is imaging God’s activity *ad extra* or in some other accidental way. In regard to degree, when two beings differ in their being to the image of God, a difference in the primary sense is much greater

¹²⁶ *Super ad Galatas* Cap. III Lect. 9.

¹²⁷ *Super 1 Cor*, Cap. XI Lect 2, n. 607

than a difference in the secondary sense. Hence in the *Scriptum* on the Sentences, when Thomas assigns to the angels a greater share in the *imago Dei* than man, and more to the higher angels than the lower angels, and a greater share to man than woman, he says that the diversity of the image of God in man and woman is less than in the others because it does not follow upon the diversity of nature according to species (*quamvis illa diversitas sit minor quam prima, quia non sequitur diversitatem naturae secundum speciem*). The reason for this underscores Thomas' constant point that man and woman are fully and equally human. Each angel is its own species, and hence each individual angel/angelic nature admits of a degree of dignity/participation in *imago Dei* in the primary sense proportioned to its nature. Because man and woman are members of the same species, on the other hand, woman is by no means more or less to the image of God than man in the primary sense.¹²⁸ When he must interpret Paul seeming to deny the image of God to woman, the resulting difference between man and woman must remain on the level of accident and he is quick to reaffirm that both man and woman are the image of God. On Thomas' reading, this is precisely the sense Paul meant to convey:

But it is better to say that the Apostle speaks clearly here. For he said of man that he is the image and glory of God; but he did not say of the woman that she is the image and glory of man, but only that she is the glory of the man. This gives us to understand that it is common to man and woman to be the image of God; but it is immediately characteristic of man to be the glory of God.¹²⁹

As Popik points out, Thomas “cleverly distinguishes between image and glory, noting that while Paul said that woman is the *glory* of man, he did not say that she is the *image* of man: this shows that Paul is not denying that both are the image of God.”¹³⁰ On Thomas' reading, then, Paul does

¹²⁸ “[U]nde oportet quod ubi intellectualis natura perfectius invenitur, etiam ibi sit imago expressior: et sic cum natura intellectualis multo sit dignior in Angelis quam in homine, eo quod propter obumbrationem intellectualis luminis homo rationalis dicitur, cum ratio sit quidam intellectus obumbratus; oportet quod in Angelis sit expressior Dei imago quam in anima, et in Angelis superioribus quam in inferioribus, et in viro quam in muliere: quamvis illa diversitas sit minor quam prima, quia non sequitur diversitatem naturae secundum speciem,” II Sent d 16 q 1 art 3c

¹²⁹ *Super 1 Cor*, Cap. XI Lect 2, n. 607

¹³⁰ Popik, “The Philosophy of Woman of St. Thomas Aquinas,” Part I, 21

not deny that man and woman are both the image of God, but rather offers an additional but secondary sense in which the man uniquely images God.

Nevertheless, the secondary *imago Dei* is not insignificant, because it has great typological power. In his early commentary on the *Sentences*, Thomas writes that because God as creator is the principle of all created things, man insofar as he is the principle of other men through generation is more to the image of God the creator than the angels, who are not principles of other beings.¹³¹ This difference corresponds to man according to the body; in this respect even according to the body man is not only to the image of God, but he is more to the image of God than the angels who are naturally more to the image of God than man. Insofar as Adam is one being and the principle of the rest of the human race, he is likened to the Creator. Insofar as his bride was taken from his side while he was in a deep sleep, Adam is likened to Christ whose bride the Church was born from the blood and water, that is the sacraments, which flowed from his side as he slept in death.

So far these typological significations do not necessarily imply a superiority or inferiority of man or woman in an interior way. Given that the earth was created first and man was created from it and is superior to it, it need not follow that since man was created first and the woman was created second and from him, man is superior to woman. However, Thomas' reading of Genesis in light of St. Paul and Aristotle does render a picture of man naturally superior to woman. Thomas argues for this along two lines. According to one line of argument, woman is less perfect than man according to the faculty of reason. As it has been repeatedly seen, woman and man differ accidentally but this accidental difference affects the core of what constitutes them as human: the faculty of reason. In his commentary on 1 Corinthians 11:7 quoted above, "in regard to what is within, man (*vir*) is more especially called the image of God, inasmuch as

¹³¹ ST I.93.3, *Super Sent.*, lib. 1 d. 3 q. 3 a. 1 ad 4.

reason *magis viget* in him,” that is, inasmuch as reason is stronger or more vigorous in him, or flourishes more in him.¹³² Thus man images God insofar as reason is more perfectly balanced in him with respect to the passions, which is a function of the greater perfection of the male body. As Popik so neatly summarizes it, for Thomas women and men “have the same substantial form, the same nature, and the same end; but they differ in perfection of that form and its operations, and in the degree of perfection of that nature.”¹³³

According to the second line of argument, man is more perfect than woman insofar as he is her principle and end. First, on the basis of 1 Corinthians 11:8-9 (“For man was not made from woman, but woman from man. Neither was man created for woman, but woman for man”) he explains what it means for man to be a principle and end. Second, he proposes that faculty of reason is greater in man than in woman, on the basis presumably of experience and natural philosophy, as we have seen. In the first line of argument, Thomas explains that in the order of the perfect and imperfect, “the perfect precedes the imperfect both in time and in nature.”¹³⁴ To support this claim he appeals to the example of growth: the boy comes before the man both in time and in perfection, and the boy is produced from the man. Thomas draws a clear parallel between the relative perfection of the two pairs of man-boy and man-woman: “For the boy is produced from the man. This, then, is the reason why the woman was produced from the man, because he is more perfect than woman.” Thus man is more perfect than woman as her principle.

¹³² *Super 1 Cor*, Cap. XI Lect 2, n. 607. *Potest etiam quantum ad interiora dici, quod vir specialius dicitur imago Dei secundum mentem, in quantum in eo ratio magis viget.*

¹³³ Popik, Part I, 51

¹³⁴ Thomas, *Commentary on 1 Corinthians* 11:7, Lect I 611. The whole of 611 is relevant to this discussion: “*talis ordo perfecti et imperfecti, quod imperfectum in uno et eodem subiecto prius est tempore, quam perfectum. Prius enim aliquis homo est puer, quam vir; simpliciter tamen perfectum est prius imperfecto, tempore et natura. Nam puer producit ex viro. Haec igitur est ratio quare mulier producta est ex viro, quia perfectior est muliere, quod ex hoc probat apostolus, quia finis est perfectior eo quod est ad finem: vir autem est finis mulieris. Et hoc est quod dicit etenim non est creatus vir propter mulierem, sed mulier propter virum, in adiutorium scilicet generationis: sicut patiens est propter agens, et materia propter formam. Unde dicitur Gen. II, 18: non est bonum hominem esse solum, faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi.*”

He is also more perfect than woman as her end, and here again Thomas draws upon Aristotle's biology of the active and passive principles of generation corresponding to male and female.

Beginning with the sentence last quoted, he writes:

This then is the reason why the woman was produced from man, because man is more perfect than woman, which the Apostle proves from this, because the end is more perfect than that which is ordained to the end: man, however, is the end of woman. And this is what he said: "And so man was not created for woman, but woman for man," namely as a help in generation: as the patient is for the agent, and matter for the form. Whence it says (Gen 2:18): "it is not good for the man to be alone, let us make a help like to him."¹³⁵

Thomas unambiguously interprets woman's creation for man in terms of the respective roles of male and female in generation, with the varying degrees of perfection that correspond to them.

The male principle is the agent which acts upon the matter supplied by the male; the female the patient which supplies the matter acted upon by the male. While both the male and female sexes as such are ordered to generation, since the purpose of sex is precisely generation in species which have a higher activity than generation, the female sex is ordered to the male in a particular way, as the patient is ordered to the agent and matter to form but not vice versa. Hence the man is more perfect than woman as her principle and end. This is in no way denigrates or detracts from God being woman's end. As we have repeatedly seen, Thomas is not at all affirming that men and women have a different *telos*, as if the ultimate end of man were God but the ultimate end of woman were man. As an intellectual creature, the end of woman is the contemplation of first truth in the beatific vision; women as well as men will be saved, and women will be feminine in the resurrected body, and may receive a higher degree of glory than men. However precisely as *feminine*, when it is a question of the end of *femininity* as such and not the end of this or that particular woman, then woman is for man as the passive material principle is for the active formal principle, and not vice versa.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

In short, for Thomas, woman was created for man and not the other way around. It is possible to read in his account of the *socialis coniunctio* a mutual “for,” inasmuch as the members of a household live with and for each other, and inasmuch as the friendship between husband and wife is the greatest of all friendships, as at its best it includes all forms of friendship (virtuous, useful, and pleasant) and the great common good of children (even though it remains an unequal friendship between a superior and an inferior). However, since he explicitly denies that man was created “for woman” and that woman *qua* woman was created for any purpose other than generation, as we have seen, it is unlikely that such a reciprocal “for” is what Thomas had in mind.¹³⁶

Does Thomas really intend to assert that the only activity of for which woman *qua* woman was created was the work of generation? In a word, yes, although the *opus generationis* extends far beyond the physical bearing of children, as we will see. The “other works” Thomas has in mind might be exterior works requiring the greater physical strength or endurance of a man, but this is an unlikely caveat. Although he does not cite the text directly here, there are striking verbal and conceptual parallels to Augustine’s *De Genesi ad Litteram*. Augustine asks whether woman was created to be a help to man in anything besides begetting children, and answers in the negative. Significantly, he includes besides the work of tilling the ground and the practical necessity of having one being in charge, the weariness of solitude, and delights of a shared life and conversation. He writes:

Now suppose the woman was not made for the man to be his helper in begetting children, then how would she be able to help him? It would hardly be the case that she would be made to till the

¹³⁶ “*Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, non est bonum hominem esse solum; faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi. Respondeo dicendum quod necessarium fuit feminam fieri, sicut Scriptura dicit, in adiutorium viri, non quidem in adiutorium alicuius alterius operis, ut quidam dixerunt, cum ad quodlibet aliud opus convenientius iuvare possit vir per alium virum quam per mulierem; sed in adiutorium generationis.*” ST I.92.1 Six questions later, he repeats the same argument using almost the same words: “*Praeterea, Gen. II, dicitur mulier esse facta in adiutorium viri. Sed non ad aliud nisi ad generationem quae fit per coitum, quia ad quodlibet aliud opus, convenientius adiuvari posset vir per virum quam per feminam. Ergo etiam in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio per coitum.*” ST I.98.2

earth with him, for there was not yet any labor required to make her help necessary. In any case, if there were any such need, a male helper would be better, and the same could be said of the comfort of another's presence if Adam were perhaps weary of solitude. How much more agreeably could two male friends, rather than a man and a woman, enjoy companionship and conversation in a life shared together (*Quanto enim congruentius ad convivendum et colloquendum duo amici pariter quam vir et mulier habitarent?*). And if they had to make an arrangement in their common life for one to command and the other to obey in order to make sure that opposing wills would not disrupt the peace of the household, there would have been proper rank to assure this, since one would be created first and the other second, and this would be further reinforced if the second were made from the first, as was the case with the woman. Surely no one will say that God was able to make from the rib of the man only a woman and not also a man if he had wished to do so. Consequently, I do not see in what sense the woman was made as a helper for the man if not for the sake of bearing children.¹³⁷

This text of *De Genesi* was known to Thomas; he quotes this very passage in his discussion of the creation of woman immediately by God from the man's rib.¹³⁸ If we grant that Thomas was informed by this text of Augustine in the present context, then there can be no doubt that Thomas means precisely what he says when he writes that a man is more efficiently helped by another man in every work except generation. While there is little indication in Thomas' account that woman qua woman was created "as a help for *man*" with any other end in view than generation, it is clear that he also considered her competent for many weighty activities involving interaction with men besides bearing children (although this in itself is no mean task).¹³⁹ To be sure, Thomas was aware of monasteries of women, and of women who were temporal rulers. He respectfully addressed a letter to the Duchess of Brabant in answer to some questions posed him concerning government, and admits in various places that women may have temporal authority.¹⁴⁰

Three important points must be made explicit. The first is that the question for Thomas in Q. 92 was not what kinds of tasks women in general are competent to do, but what women can

¹³⁷ Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* 9.5.9, Genesis 1-11 (*Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture: Old Testament, Volume I, Genesis 1-11*); PL 34: 396.

¹³⁸ ST I.92.4 sed contra

¹³⁹ Note that this refers to the order of creation, not to the order of redemption. For St. Thomas, Mary is a "help" to man in the order of redemption because as the Mother of God, she gave a human nature to the Word who became flesh for our salvation; her divine maternity is the ultimate guarantor for Christological orthodoxy, and by her men are flooded with the light of grace. Cf. Aidan Nichols, "The Mariology of St. Thomas," *Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction*, Daniel A. Keating, Thomas G. Weinandy, John P. Yocum, eds., T & T Clark, London: 2004, 241-60. Also cf. Charles de Koninck, "Ego Sapientia," Part II "Nigra sum, sed formosa," 27-28.

¹⁴⁰ cf. *De regimine Iudaeorum, ad Ducissam Brabantiae*, in Popik Part II footnote 96

do that men cannot do. In the *ST*, woman's creation "for man" for the work of generation is in the context of the creation account; sexual differentiation is the means by which new members of the human species come into being through the union of man and woman. Second, Thomas is emphatically not affirming that all women are good for is bearing children, as noble a vocation as this is. As an intellectual nature, woman has an even higher life than that of generation, namely the life of *intelligere* (ST I.92.1); she is the image of God and she is ordered to union with God in the beatific vision.¹⁴¹ Hence Q. 92 on the creation of woman is immediately followed by Q. 93 on the end or term of the production of man (*hominis*), namely the *imago Dei*

¹⁴¹ Pia de Solenni proposes a theory of sexually differentiated cognition according to which the minds of men and women operate differently, not according to different grades of a single perfection but according to two equal perfections. She suggests that feminine reason is primarily the action of *intellectus*, the immediate and simple grasping of truth, whereas masculine reason is more typically the action of *ratio*, the process of discursive reason. The difference in reason between men and women is not one of two different rationalities (which would render communication impossible) but of two actions of the human mind which are had by both men and women, with the difference being that the action of *intellectus* is more connatural to women for the most part and that of *ratio* more connatural to men for the most part. "Every man and woman has both *intellectus* and *ratio*...If [woman] is associated with the virtues of *intellectus*, we could say that man is associated with the virtues of *ratio*." (de Solenni, pp. 152, 4) This conception has the benefit of according both with the ancient and medieval intuition that reason (or its exercise) is different in men and women, and with the modern intuition that the difference between men and women is one of equal dignity even if it is of unequal relative perfection.

De Solenni's interesting proposal poses a couple of problems that need addressing. First, she claims that the characteristic intellectual virtues of man and woman help the other develop the full perfection of their own rational powers (ibid, pp 153-4). Thomas, however, explicitly denies that woman was created as a helpmate for man in any work other than the work of generation alone (ST I.92.1). Secondly, it must be specified whether the difference in characteristic intellectual activity/virtue (de Solenni uses both terms, perhaps not in the same way as Thomas would) is a difference in reason itself, or a difference in reason as it is expressed in the composite, originating in the physical differences of the male and female bodies. For Thomas, there is no distinction of sex in the mind: "the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction" (ST I.93.6 ad 2). Thirdly, it is highly doubtful that De Solenni's association of woman with *intelligere* and man with *rationari* is in agreement with Thomas' thought on the exercise of reason in men and women. Thomas consistently associates woman with lower reason with woman and *rationari* and man with higher reason and *intellectus* (ST I.78.8, 9; DV 15.art 4 ad 7; *Super 1 Cor* cap. 11 Lect. I.590, Lect.III.614; In Io. Ev. Exp. Iv.2.6.590; *Super 1 Tim*, cap. 2 lect. 3. Insofar as Thomas assigns a kind of sexual differentiation to the mind, he associates men with higher reason and therefore with *intellectus*, and women with lower reason and therefore with *rationari*. In his treatment of man's intellectual operations, *intelligere*, *intellectus*, the contemplation of eternal things, and the virtue of wisdom correspond with higher reason; *rationari*, *ratio*, the consideration of temporal things, and the virtue of science correspond with lower reason.) This leads to the final point: if *intelligere* is superior to *rationari* on Thomas' account, then the one who more fully possessed the superior *intelligere* would be simply superior to the other, thus undermining De Solenni's claim for the equal nobility of the expression of reason in both. Ultimately, De Solenni's proposal does not succeed as an exegesis of St. Thomas.

to which both *vir* and *mulier* were created.¹⁴² (As an aside: the supernatural vocation of consecrated virginity in the order of redemption testifies with particular eloquence that the perpetuation of the human species is not woman's sole end, but rather that woman was created primarily for union with God.)

Drawing upon Bernard Lonergan's distinction between the horizontal and vertical ends of human nature may be helpful here, bearing in mind that while horizontal and the vertical are distinct, they interpenetrate each other.¹⁴³ Writing on the horizontal and vertical finality of marriage, Bernard Lonergan points out that "the most essential good of marriage is the child but its most excellent end lies on the supernatural level...[T]he compenetrating consciousness of lives shared by marriage is dynamic and reaches forth to will and to realize in common the advance in Christian perfection that leads from the consummation of two-in-one-flesh to the consummation of the beatific vision."¹⁴⁴ On the natural and horizontal plane, femininity is ordered to generation in that it is sexual differentiation alone that made the continuation of the human species possible. On the supernatural and vertical plane, both women and men are ordered to a good which entirely surpasses nature and its limitations: the beatific vision of God in eternal life. Furthermore, the vertical plane admits a degree of equality surpasses that of the horizontal, as grace surpasses nature. "Grace for St. Thomas is an equalizer, which totally transcends and overcomes the inferiority-superiority of women and men on the natural level."¹⁴⁵ In the glorious risen body, the diverse perfections of masculinity and femininity will shine in praise of the divine wisdom which created them. It is also the case that a woman may attain a higher degree of glory than a man, since the measure of glory is the perfection of charity which

¹⁴² ST I.93.4 ad 1

¹⁴³ Bernard Lonergan, "Finality, Love, Marriage," *Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan*, ed. F. E. Crowe, Herder and Herder, New York: 1967, 16-53

¹⁴⁴ Lonergan 22, 37.

¹⁴⁵ Popik Part I 48

so surpasses nature as not to be affected by natural limitations. In fact, of all created persons, all angels and human beings, the most exalted created person is a woman: the blessed Virgin.

Thirdly, it must be borne in mind that for Thomas, the work of generation is not limited to conceiving and bearing children. By nature it includes the education of the offspring and family life: “Now marriage has for its principal end the begetting and rearing of children, and this end is competent to man according to his generic nature...But for its secondary end...it has, among men alone, the community of works that are a necessity of life.” To be a mother or father calls upon all the human faculties. Intellectual and moral virtue is required to form children in virtue and happiness, and thus a mother and father must draw upon all the riches of the affective dimension of their persons, and their intellect and will. This means that motherhood and fatherhood are not only physical, but also intensely personal and spiritual. In the order of grace, marriage as a sacrament has another end, namely “the signification of Christ and the Church” by their mutual “fidelity.”¹⁴⁶ Thomas clearly recognizes with Aristotle that complementary virtues and skills are needed for mothers and fathers to educate children, and for the domestic friendship of husband and wife, even if this notion of complementarity is partly obscured by a false picture of the inequality of men and women.¹⁴⁷ Marriage with its complementarity of men and women on the natural level is raised to the dignity of a sacrament with the institution of marriage as a sacrament of the New Law of Jesus Christ. Writing of the creation of woman, the “work of generation” would have its immediate context not in marriage as a sacrament of the New Law,

¹⁴⁶ ST Supp. 65.1c

¹⁴⁷ There are real inequalities flowing from real differences (e.g. a man cannot conceive and bear children whereas a woman can), and false inequalities flowing from false differences (e.g. the inequality of dignity flowing from the relative strength of reason vis-à-vis the passions in man and woman). The picture of complementarity that Thomas presents needs to be corrected of its premises that woman’s reason is less perfect than the man’s owing to her being *occasionata*, from which it follows for Thomas that the virtues and spheres of activity of the husband are *dignior* than those of the wife. Still, both sets of virtues and skills are valuable and necessary for a harmonious home and this is a real foundation in St. Thomas for a theory of complementarity.

but to marriage in the state of innocence. Even so, Thomas clearly understands the creation of woman from the man's side to prefigure the Church born from the pierced side of Christ on the cross, even as marriage as a sacrament of the Church is the "great sacrament" of the love of Christ crucified for his bride, the Church.¹⁴⁸ Thus even sexual differentiation in its "horizontal" dimension is taken up and elevated into the vertical, as the order of redemption builds upon and perfects the order of creation.

To summarize: St. Thomas, seeking the wisdom principle that would reveal the harmony St. Paul's affirmation that man is the image of God while woman is the image of man in harmony with Genesis 1:26, distinguished the image of God into primary and secondary senses. In the primary sense, the image of God belongs to the intellectual nature. Since man and woman are equal in nature, since they are also equally to the image of God in the primary sense. In a secondary sense, man but not woman is to the image of God. While the typological argument (the first man as a sign of the Creator and of Christ) remains valid, the premises of his argument from reason *magis viget* and the argument from the respective roles in the generation process are the erroneous biological premises of science inherited from Aristotle and now known to be erroneous. Still, even if secondary sense remains secondary in degree and in importance, it is to be appreciated as a gift given uniquely to man (*vir*), which in no way detracts from the dignity of woman. Thomas' nuanced account of the primary and secondary senses of the image of God lays the foundation for a truly theological treatment of how the image of God may be expressed differently in masculinity and femininity, while remaining one on the level of essence.

Sexual differentiation and Modern science

¹⁴⁸ ST I.92.2

With the benefit of a biology clarified of the inaccurate data of its antiquated elder brothers, it still remains for us moderns to see how the bodily differences of men and women are reflected in the minds of men and women, and what consequences such differences may have in the family, in society, and before the Triune God. McGowan argues that “modern biological data show that man and woman contribute the same kind of stuff to the offspring...The implication of modern biology for Thomas’ doctrine of woman is that revision and reformation are necessary. But we may still accept the principles of Thomas’ philosophical anthropology.”¹⁴⁹ That is to say, if both parents contribute matter and genetic material to the offspring in the form of a living gamete cell, and the sex of the offspring is determined thus and not by a defect in the male principle or thwart in the natural generation process, then the female sex is no more *occasionatus* than the male. Neither the male nor the female sex is *occasionatus* with regard either to particular nature or to universal nature. Furthermore, if the inequality of souls originates in the diversity of bodies and the corresponding diversity of degrees of receptivity to the form, and if the difference in male and female bodies is not one of imperfection, then there is no basis for assigning imperfection to woman’s soul. It is from the understanding of woman as inferior in body and in soul that Thomas derives his claim that woman is naturally less wise than man and naturally subject to him. McGowan concludes: “if Thomas’ philosophical anthropology and modern biological data are accepted, there does not seem to be a ‘better’ sex: woman is not the *imperfectus sexus*.”¹⁵⁰ If there is a basis for a natural domestic headship of man in the order of creation and a supernatural headship of man in the order of grace, it must be sought outside of Aristotelian reproductive biology.

¹⁴⁹ McGowan 132.

¹⁵⁰ McGowan 133.

A complete philosophy of human nature must account for how each individually existing human being is a man or a woman. If each human individual is a material substance composed of body and soul, and is by nature either male or female, then the difference must flow from one of the two elements which compose human nature: either the formal element which is the soul, or the material element which is the body, or both. Aristotle and Thomas located the difference in the material element, such that the physical differences in the bodies of male and female animals follow from the structure of the generation process itself. Thus the female is that which generates in itself and provides the matter to be formed by the male semen, and the male is that which generates in another and forms the matter provided by the female, and for this purpose the bodies of male and female animals differ.¹⁵¹

Edith Stein located the cause of sexual differentiation in the soul. Since the soul is the form of the body which organizes the parts according to their functions and the structure of the whole, and male and female bodies and souls are structured for different purposes, she argues that the cause of being male or female must be in that which forms the body to be this or that way.

Only the person blinded by the passion of controversy could deny that woman in soul and body is formed for a particular purpose...Both physically and spiritually she is endowed for this purpose, as is seen clearly from practical experience. However, it follows also from the Thomistic principle of *anima forma corporis* that such a spiritual characteristic does exist. Of course, woman shares a basic human nature, but basically her faculties are different from men; therefore, a differing type of soul must exist as well.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ "...the female does not contribute semen to generation, but does contribute something, and [this] is the matter of the catamenia, or that which is analogous to it in bloodless animals...For there must needs be that which generates and that from which it generates; even if these be one, still they must be distinct in form and their essence must be different; and in those animals that have these powers separate in two sexes the body and nature of the active and passive sex must also differ. If, then, the male stands for the effective and active, and the female, considered as female, for the passive, it follows that what the female would contribute to the semen of the male would not be semen but material for the semen to work upon," GA I.20.728a22-32; also cf. GA I.2.716a15

¹⁵² Edith Stein, "The Ethos of Women's Professions," *The Collected Works of Edith Stein*, vol. 2, *Essays on Woman*, trans. Freda Mary Oben, Washington, DC: ICS Publications, 1987, 43. "The insistence that the sexual differences are 'stipulated by the body alone' is questionable from various points of view. 1) If anima=forma corporis, then bodily differentiation constitutes an index of differentiation in the spirit. 2) Matter serves form, not the reverse. That strongly suggests that the difference in the psyche is the primary one," letter to Sr. Callista Kopf, OP, 8 August

However, if male and female are differences in the soul, it is difficult to see how a male and female animal remain two members of the same species. Stein clearly affirms that both “share a basic human nature,” but she is less clear in delineating how “basically her faculties are different from men.” Precisely what corresponds in woman’s soul to those particular powers and gifts that are observable to a biologist or from the “practical experience”? If male and female are two individuals of the same species, then it must follow that maleness and femaleness are not substantial differences (species-making differences) but rather accidental differences. If sex is an accidental difference, what kind of accident is it? It seems to be a necessary accident, as two distinct but essential modes of human nature, since every individual of the species is either male or female, but Stein’s account does not specify. It is also not clear how a difference can be in the formal principle without being a formal difference, that is, a substantial, species-making difference.

While the deficiencies of the Aristotelian biology make it necessary to account for sexual differentiation in some other way than Aristotle and Thomas did, the material component of human nature remains a valid avenue for inquiring into the cause of sexual differentiation. Locating the cause of sexual differentiation in the material cause, as Thomas did, makes it possible to account both for the substantial univocity of species for the sexes and for the different spiritual characteristics and endowments of men and women. On Thomas’ account, the doctrine of the inequality of souls following upon bodily differences makes it possible to speak of a feminine soul, if by this we mean that the person as union of soul and matter as such is necessarily male or female, and that “this soul is adapted to this and not to that body, and that

1931, in *Self-Portrait in Letters, 1916-1942*, Gelber & Leuven, eds. Washington, DC: ICS Publications, 1993, 99. Cf. also the review of the lecture upon which Stein based her essay “The Ethos of Women’s Professions” in *Essays on Women*, 18-21.

soul to another body, and so in all other instances. And such adaptabilities remain in souls even after the bodies have perished.”¹⁵³

We now know that the father’s sperm cell contributes the chromosome that determines the sex of the embryo, giving the embryo from its conception a male or female genetic structure, and that this genetically determined sexual difference has organizational/structural effects throughout the organism as it develops, matures and ages.¹⁵⁴ The differences between a man as a body-soul composite and a woman as a body-soul composite are not only those of an essentially similar but accidentally different soul informing identical matter, as differently-shaped cookies can be made from one lump of dough with differently-shaped cookie cutters. There is something different in the dough to begin with, so to speak. Continuing the baking analogy, the question becomes: are the male and female composite like two different kinds of dough cut with the same cookie cutter, or are they two different kinds of dough cut with two differently shaped cookie cutters? Because a man or a woman is composed of body and soul, a change on either level results in a difference in the composite being. This does not rule out Stein’s contention that there are formal differences corresponding to the material differences, but the material side of the

¹⁵³ SCG II.81.8

¹⁵⁴ “The determination of sex is largely genetic. In mammals, the Y chromosome present in males controls the process by which an undifferentiated primitive gonad develops into testes...The testes subsequently secrete testosterone, which stimulates the development of male reproductive organs and, in puberty, the appearance of male secondary sexual characteristics such as facial hair and the deepening of the voice. Gonadal hormones also influence the development of neurons. Testosterone is released in males during a brief period in the course of prenatal brain development, and it subsequently acts to alter the brain, much as it alters the sex organs. This process is called masculinization. Just as testosterone does not affect all body organs, it does not affect all regions of the brain. It does, however, affect many brain regions and in many different ways. For instance, it affects the number of neurons formed in certain brain areas, reduces the number of neurons that die, increases cell growth, and regulates the activity of synapses...[E]strogen also likely influences postnatal brain development. Goldstein and colleagues found sex differences in the volume of cortical regions that are known to have differential levels of receptors for testosterone and estrogen respectively...(Goldstein et al., 2001). Clearly, hormones alter brain development: a male brain and a female brain are not the same...Testosterone changes the structure of cells in many regions of the cortex, with diverse behavioral consequences that include influences on cognitive processes...Gonadal hormones alter the basic development of neurons, shape the nature of experience-dependent changes in the brain, and influence the structure of neurons throughout our lifetimes.” Brian Kolb & Ian Whishaw, *An Introduction to Brain and Behavior*, 2nd ed., New York: Worth Publishers, 2006

question remains a promising avenue for enquiring into what accounts for sexual differentiation, and a necessary one.

It is clear that sexual differentiation has far-reaching effects in the human body beyond the primary and secondary sexual characteristics. It is standard neurology textbook material that brain development proceeds along sexually differentiated lines. The sex hormone testosterone plays a key role in prenatal brain development, resulting in the phenomenon in males known as the masculinization of the brain. The sex hormone estrogen plays a key role in postnatal brain development in both males and females. Sexual dimorphism appears in: recovery from traumatic brain injury, cortical complexity¹⁵⁵, brain and cerebrospinal fluid volume, and brain aging.¹⁵⁶ Various neurological diseases also display a marked sexual dimorphism. Członkowska et al. have examined “the inflammation-modulating effects of estrogens as one potential explanatory factor for sexual dimorphism in the prevalence of numerous neurological diseases” such as stroke, Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s diseases, multiple sclerosis, or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, and proposed that “clinical and experimental studies have established estrogen as a neuroprotective hormone in these diseases.”¹⁵⁷ There is also a marked gender difference in the incidence of depression.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ Eileen Luders, Katherine L Narr, Paul M Thompson, David E Rex, Lutz Jancke, Helmuth Steinmetz & Arthur W Toga, “Gender differences in cortical complexity,” *Nature Neuroscience* 7, 799 - 800 (2004).

¹⁵⁶ R C Gur, P D Mozley, S M Resnick, G L Gottlieb, M Kohn, R Zimmerman, G Herman, S Atlas, R Grossman, D Berretta, “Gender differences in age effect on brain atrophy measured by magnetic resonance imaging,” *PNAS--Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, April 1, 1991, vol. 88 no. 7, 2845–2849.

¹⁵⁷ cf. Anna Członkowska, Agnieszka Ciesielska, Grazyna Gromadzka, Iwona Kurkowska-Jastrzębska, “Gender differences in neurological disease,” *Endocrine* 29(2) 2006: 243

¹⁵⁸ Hankin, Benjamin L.; Abramson, Lyn Y. “Development of gender differences in depression: An elaborated cognitive vulnerability–transactional stress theory.” *Psychological Bulletin*, 127(6) 2001: 773-796. Hyde, Janet Shibley; Mezulis, Amy H.; Abramson, Lyn Y. “The ABCs of depression: Integrating affective, biological, and cognitive models to explain the emergence of the gender difference in depression.” *Psychological Review*, 115(2) 2008: 291-313.

The perennial intuition that men and women think differently is reflected in cognitive studies. In 2005, then-Harvard University president Lawrence Summers in his remarks at a National Bureau of Economics Conference, partly ascribed the under-representation of women in positions at top ten science and math research institutions to aptitude, citing a study of the top 5% of high-performing in math and science high school seniors in which men outnumbered women 2 to 1.¹⁵⁹ Public opinion was fast and furious, but the research has tended to corroborate rather than contradict the evidence which Summers cited. Alan Feingold argued that cognitive gender differences in language and math performance tend to shrink over time from elementary to middle to high school, but “the important exception to the rule of vanishing gender differences is that the well-documented gender gap at the upper levels of performance on high school mathematics has remained constant over the past 27 years.”¹⁶⁰ The difference between men and women at the high end of the math performance spectrum was corroborated by Hyde, et al.¹⁶¹ Halpern et al. found that

Sex differences in science and math achievement and ability are smaller for the mid-range of the abilities distribution than they are for those with the highest levels of achievement and ability. Males are more variable on most measures of quantitative and visuospatial ability, which

¹⁵⁹ Lawrence Summers, “Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying the Science & Engineering Workforce,” Cambridge, Mass., January 14, 2005. <http://web.archive.org/web/20080130023006/http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/2005/nber.html>. Cf. Xie and Shauman, *Women in Science: Career Processes and Outcomes*. Boston, MA : Harvard University Press, 2003.

¹⁶⁰ Alan Feingold, “Cognitive gender differences are disappearing,” *American Psychologist*, 43(2) 1988, quoting abstract accessed on May 1, 2013 at <http://psycnet.apa.org/?fa=main.doiLanding&doi=10.1037/0003-066X.43.2.95>. In his abstract, Feingold writes that “Gender differences in cognitive abilities were determined using the norms from the four standardizations of the Differential Aptitude Tests conducted between 1947 and 1980, and from the four standardizations of the Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test/Scholastic Aptitude Test conducted between 1960 and 1983. The standardized gender differences (ds) were averaged over grade of examinees and year of standardization to obtain a mean effect size for each ability, and variations among effect sizes were examined for grade, year, and Grade \times Year trends. Girls scored higher than boys on scales of grammar, spelling, and perceptual speed; boys had higher means on measures of spatial visualization, high school mathematics, and mechanical aptitude; and no average gender differences were found on tests of verbal reasoning, arithmetic, and figural reasoning. Gender differences declined precipitously over the years surveyed, and the increases in these differences over the high school grades have diminished.”

¹⁶¹ Hyde, Janet S.; Fennema, Elizabeth; Lamon, Susan J. “Gender differences in mathematics performance: A meta-analysis.” *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol 107(2), Mar 1990, 139-155.

necessarily results in more males at both high- and low-ability extremes.... Females tend to excel in verbal abilities, with large differences between females and males found when assessments include writing samples... Males outperform females on most measures of visuospatial abilities, which have been implicated as contributing to sex differences on standardized exams in mathematics and science... A wide range of sociocultural forces contribute to sex differences in mathematics and science achievement and ability—including the effects of family, neighborhood, peer, and school influences; training and experience; and cultural practices. We conclude that early experience, biological factors, educational policy, and cultural context affect the number of women and men who pursue advanced study in science and math and that these effects add and interact in complex ways.¹⁶²

As the authors of the study above noted, the factors which contribute to the particular cognitive functions that are able to be quantified are inherently complex and include sociological, cultural, family, and other external experiential factors as well as the biological factors. The evidence by no means warrants concluding to an absolute correspondence between the observable cognitive differences between the sexes and merely biological or neurological differences.

It is necessary when discussing thinking and the brain to avoid two possible hasty missteps. The first is to identify cognitive activity with neurological activity simply. This would be an unwarranted reduction of the intellect to the organs of the body. The second misstep would be to divorce cognition absolutely from the body. While the intellect is not a power of any material organ, and while the intellect can perform its act without matter, and thus thinking is not merely a function or epiphenomenon of the brain or any bodily organ, yet the operation of the human intellect requires the body for the fullness of its natural operation. Brain function and cognitive function are not reducible to each other but they are closely related; hence traumatic brain injury is correlated with loss of cognitive, sensory, and motor functions.

Teleology of Masculinity and Femininity

¹⁶² Diane F. Halpern, Camilla P. Benbow, David C. Geary, Ruben C. Gur, Janet Shibley Hyde, and Morton Ann Gernsbacher, "The Science of Sex Differences in Science and Mathematics," *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, 8 (2007), abstract accessed May 1, 2013 at <http://psi.sagepub.com/content/8/1/1.abstract>

With Aristotle and Thomas we can look to the teleology of masculinity and femininity for insight into to their place in human nature. To ask about the *telos* of a thing is to ask what it is for. Therefore, to ask about the *telos* of masculinity and femininity is to ask what masculinity is for and what femininity is for. If sex is primarily a facet of the material side of human nature, then the place to begin asking after the purpose of the male sex and the female sex is in the parts of the body in which there is the most significant sexual differentiation, and this is in the sexual organs. The answer to the question “What are the sexual organs for” seems to be precisely what Aristotle and Thomas proposed, namely, that they are for generation.

“But,” someone might object, “sexual activity is extremely pleasurable, and people have sex in order to experience pleasure, or in order to express and deepen their affection and intimacy for one another.” All true, but whereas the conjugal act is the kind of act that men and women do in order to have babies, having sex is not the only way to experience pleasure, or to express intimacy or affection. There are many answers to the question, “What do you do to experience pleasure or express affection?” but not so “What do human beings naturally do to have babies?” It might be further objected: “Generation through *in vitro* fertilization and cloning does not require the sexual organs *per se* but only sperm cells and egg cells (for IVF) or an egg cell and the nucleus of a somatic cell (for cloning). Therefore the sex act and the sexual organs are not *per se* necessary for generation.” In response, it must be noted that even if the generation of new human life can be artificially divorced from the sexual act in IVF and cloning, the sexual organs are not altogether bypassed: the sperm cells required for IVF and the egg cells required for both IVF and cloning are produced by a sexual organ. The appeal to these practices actually thus serves to highlight rather than to undermine the claim that the sexual organs are for the

purpose of generation, since they are necessary to supply the matter for generation even when this generation is divorced artificially from the natural context of the sexual act.

It would be overly hasty to dismiss Aristotle and Thomas' association of the teleology of femininity with generation simply on the basis of their faulty biological data. This would be to shirk the necessary legwork of following up on McGowan and Hartel's call to disentangle the Aristotelian-Thomistic anthropology from the false conclusions drawn from faulty data. If the teleology of masculinity and femininity is rooted in the sexual powers of the body of man and woman, and if the purpose of these sexual organs is generation, then it seems to follow that the teleology of femininity and masculinity is to be found in motherhood and fatherhood, respectively. That is, masculinity is for the sake of fatherhood, and femininity is for the sake of motherhood. As femininity is for masculinity in the work of generation¹⁶³, so also masculinity is for femininity; motherhood is not possible without the masculine, nor fatherhood without the feminine. Thomas' reading of 1 Cor 11:7-9 does not seem to allow for a reciprocal "for"; femininity is for masculinity but not vice versa. On this point Aristotle himself is closer to the reality than Thomas, when he says that "If [the female animal could generate on its own] the existence of the male animal would have no purpose, and Nature does nothing that lacks purpose."¹⁶⁴ Nolan, commenting on this passage, remarks that it is "important, for it amounts to the explicit assertion that the male animal exists for generating no less than does the female, though, as has been seen, neither female nor male animal [sic] exists principally for this purpose."¹⁶⁵ This view is much closer to John Paul II's repeated emphasis on the reciprocal "for"

¹⁶³ cf. Thomas' reading of Genesis 2:18 in ST I.92.1

¹⁶⁴ GA 2.5.741b4

¹⁶⁵ Nolan, "Women in Aristotle and Aquinas," 42

of man for woman and woman for man in his treatment of the divine image in the series of catecheses gathered under the title “Theology of the Body.”¹⁶⁶

The most fundamental definition of masculinity and femininity for Aristotle is free from any biological particulars except these: “By a male animal we mean one that generates in another, by a female animal, one that generates in itself.”¹⁶⁷ If it is false that the male contributes the active principle that forms the passive, material principle supplied by the female, and if it is false that the male principle *qua* formal and active is therefore more perfect than female principle *qua* material and passive, then several conclusions seem to follow. First, the basis in the generation process for assigning a greater or lesser perfection to the role of man or woman disappears, since both man and woman make a similar kind of material contribution to the embryo conceived and the sex is genetically determined by the genetic material contributed by the male. Thus, woman is not *occasionatus* with respect to *natura particularis*.

What are we to make of Thomas’ statement that the woman *qua* woman is for man but the man *qua* man is not for woman,¹⁶⁸ if both the male and female sexes as such are ordered to generation and the female sex is not ordered to the male as the patient is ordered to the agent and matter to form? The purpose of sex is precisely generation in species which have a higher activity than generation. It does not follow, then, that the female is ordered to the male more than the male is ordered to the female on the basis of the generation process alone. These considerations do not suffice to overturn the idea that the *telos* of sexual differentiation is generation, nor do they negate Aristotle’s most basic description of the male as the one which generates in another (father) and the female as the one which generates in itself (mother). What

¹⁶⁶ TOB 10:1, 14:4, 17:6, 89:1-6

¹⁶⁷ GA1.2.716a15

¹⁶⁸ *Super 1 Corinthios*, Lect. n. 611

this means for man and woman is this: man as male is for the sake of fatherhood and the woman as female is for the sake of motherhood.

It must be emphasized that a teleology of fatherhood for masculinity and femininity for motherhood includes but is not limited to the physical and biological begetting and bearing of children. Motherhood and fatherhood are also intensely personal and spiritual, drawing on the affective dimension of the person and the intellect and will. This is precisely what we find in Thomas' own account, where the "work of generation" extends much further than biological life, namely, to the education of children and family life, and to the complementary virtues and spheres of authority of husband and wife. Recalling that a certain inequality (i.e. difference, though an accidental and not a species-making difference) of souls follows upon the inequality (that is, the difference) of bodies, we may re-introduce and extend St. Edith Stein's insight that femininity is reflected in the very souls of women. Extending her insight and applying it to our considerations of motherhood and fatherhood, we may reason that woman in soul and body is formed for the particular purpose of generating life within herself, and both physically and spiritually endowed for this purpose. Likewise, man in soul and body is formed for the particular purpose of generating life in another, and both physically and spiritually endowed for this purpose.¹⁶⁹ The secondary sense of the *imago Dei* in the man may be re-examined in this context. As a father, *vir* remains a unique image of "God the Father from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named" (Eph 3:15). The limited scope of this study will permit no more than to propose these physical and spiritual endowments of motherhood and fatherhood as an important and fascinating area of further study for biology, psychology, philosophy and theology.

¹⁶⁹ Edith Stein, "The Ethos of Women's Professions," *The Collected Works of Edith Stein*, vol. 2, *Essays on Woman*, trans. Freda Mary Oben, Washington, DC: ICS Publications, 1987, p. 43.

In light of these considerations, what are we to make of Thomas' claims for the natural subjection of woman to man? Hartel argues that "Since it has not been shown that woman is less perfect than man either biologically or physically, or that she has a stronger sense appetite, we cannot say that subordination of woman to man is essential to [Thomas'] integral feminism."¹⁷⁰ Hartel's proposed solution is attractive but ultimately unsatisfying. He would retain the differences of men and women in Thomas' account while redefining them out of the categories of greater and lesser perfection, such that the differences are complementary and equal in dignity, and would reject woman's subordination.¹⁷¹ This solution is attractive because it accords with contemporary socio-cultural sensibilities, it uses the language of dignity and equality to support the common-sense judgments that there is something profoundly different about men and women yet men and women are also profoundly equal, and with certain fundamental Christian teachings.

However, Hartel's solution fails to satisfy in that it is rather *a priori* and insufficiently theological. The problem with such a proposed solution is that for Thomas, man and woman and their reciprocal relations are not merely a chapter in Aristotle's biology, nor are they merely an object of experience for the investigation of human reason, but they are also *datum* of revelation. Thomas approached the difficult New Testament texts with a great openness and confidence, and engaged Genesis 1 and 2 with St. Paul in the certainty that there was a wisdom principle capable of shedding light on both and reconciling the *aporiae*. This wisdom principle (viz. the primary and secondary senses of the *imago dei*) may have been obscured in its application to faulty data, but it is no less valid a proposal. Thomas' concept of woman's natural subjection cannot be

¹⁷⁰ Hartel, *Femina Ut Imago Dei* p. 336. "Integral feminism" is Hartel's term for Thomas' theory of woman, an adapted borrowing of J. Maritain's term "integral humanism."

¹⁷¹ "We should reject, too, the terminology of perfection vs. imperfection. These terms simply do not apply today. Lastly, as a consequence...we should advocate the dismissal of woman's subordination," "The Integral Feminism of St. Thomas Aquinas," 12. Cf. also *Femina Ut Imago Dei* 337-40

dismissed simply by dismissing the erroneous biological data, because his arguments are properly theological as well as biological. If we dismiss Thomas' interpretation of 1 Corinthians 11:8-9 according to which man is the end of woman in terms of his greater perfection as the formal, active principle is the end of the material, passive principle, we are still left with 1 Corinthians 11:8-9; if we dismiss his interpretation of St. Paul's injunctions for women's silence in the churches in 1 Timothy 2:11-12 and 1 Corinthians 14: 34-35 in terms of woman being *defectu rationis* with respect to man, we are still left with 1 Timothy 2:11-12 and 1 Corinthians 14: 34-35. What, then, are we to make of the numerous Scripture passages which seem to speak of woman's subjection to man as a normative aspect of the order of creation and salvation? Biblical theology would have much to contribute on this point and is a necessary next step for the proper development of the theology of the *imago dei* in men and women.

One Contemporary approach: John Paul II's Theology of the Body

If this study succeeds in preparing the ground for developing St. Thomas' theology of the image of God in men and women, it may well be asked where one goes from here. In fact, that work has already begun: John Paul II's Theology of the Body merits careful study as a development and advancement of the theology of the *imago Dei* in continuity with St. Thomas.¹⁷² It would be altogether beyond the scope of the present study to do more than suggest that John Paul II's interpretation of Genesis 1-2 in his theology of the body as a completion and enrichment of Thomas' thought on man and woman in the created order. It will not be going too far, however, to point out the benefits of such a study and to propose some general questions. First, John Paul II was free from the limitations of certain errors that were bound up with

¹⁷² The metaphysics and anthropology of Aquinas are at least partly the consciously presupposed foundation of TOB's subjective account of man and woman in the divine plan, cf. TOB 51:6, 54:2, 66:6, 93:5, 98:7. 130:1

Aristotelian science, namely, the doctrine of man and woman as matter/form, agent/patient contraries in the generation process, and the doctrine of *femina est mas occasionatius per respectum ad naturam particularem*. Also, as John Paul II himself claimed, his social and cultural sensibilities were different. This presented him with a different set of *aporiae* and thus a different set of questions than those which St. Thomas brought to the revealed word.

There are at least four crucial points of discussion for reading John Paul II in continuity with St. Thomas on the image of God in man and woman. First there is the question of the image of God in the human body. The power of the body to be an image of God was an important point of apparent disagreement between St. Thomas and John Paul II, but both speak of the body as bearing the *impress* of the divine¹⁷³, and it is highly unlikely that John Paul II is claiming that the body is more *imago Dei* than *vestigium Dei*. The “spousal meaning of the body” in its masculinity and femininity clarifies in what respect the human body bears the impress of God, namely, as a sign of man’s call to communion.¹⁷⁴ This emphasis on the spousal meaning of the body, and on man’s call to communion which it signifies, is most likely a complementary addition if not a genetic development to Thomas’ notion of the generative purpose of sexual differentiation.

Another question is the image of the Trinity in human *communio*. For John Paul II, “Man becomes an image of God not so much in the moment of solitude as in the moment of communion.”¹⁷⁵ While Thomas in one context denies that the image of God is in man “severally,”¹⁷⁶ in his mature commentary on John 17:21-22 he states plainly that there is a certain likeness between the essential unity of nature and love in the Trinity, and the unity of all human

¹⁷³ TOB 13:2, ST I.93.6 ad 3

¹⁷⁴ TOB 13:4-16:2

¹⁷⁵ TOB 9:3

¹⁷⁶ ST I.93.6 ad 2

beings inasmuch as they share one nature (albeit they are numerically distinct human natures), and the unity of believers and the blessed participating in the charity founded on faith (in the wayfarer) or beatific knowledge (in the comprehensor).¹⁷⁷ John Paul II's affirmation fits perfectly with Thomas' notion of *unitas* in his commentary on John 17 if both are understood to be based in a concept of degrees of perfection of the image of God in man by nature, grace, and glory. Thus human *communio* or *unitas* is the visible overflow of grace and glory among men.

The third point to consider is that of Trinitarian theology. Many have seriously questioned whether the Trinitarian theologies the two men advanced are compatible, and Michael Waldstein is currently taking up this question. The fourth point to study is the notion of relative perfection of men and women for St. Thomas and for John Paul II. John Paul II seems to have a much broader account of the relative perfection of men and women than St. Thomas, in terms of viewing the two as different yet complementary perfections that are equal in dignity, and hence the reciprocal "for" of man and woman.¹⁷⁸ This may be an issue on which John Paul II and St. Thomas have a truly contradictory difference. At any rate, John Paul II's theology of the body is a fascinating and potentially fruitful development of St. Thomas' anthropology on many points, and as such it is an important avenue of study for students of the Angelic Doctor.

Conclusion

As C.S. Lewis remarked, "We all want progress. But progress means getting nearer to the place you want to be and if you have taken a wrong turning, then to go forward does not get you any nearer. If you are on the wrong road, progress means doing an about-turn and walking back to the right road; and in that case, the man who turns back soonest is the most progressive

¹⁷⁷ *Super 1 Io.* cap. 17 Lect 3, 5

¹⁷⁸ The comparison of TOB 17:6 and ST I.92.1 is striking.

man.”¹⁷⁹ As Thomas sagely remarks in the same vein, a small error in the beginning is a great one in the end.¹⁸⁰ This study has attempted to pick up where earlier scholars left off on the question of the relation of Aristotle’s biology to Thomas’ doctrine of women. The biological premises for Thomas’ assertion that *femina est mas occasionatus* and that women are *debilior rationis quam vir* have been shown to be false; progress in Thomas’ anthropology must begin by retracing its steps to the right road, where his principles began to be applied to false data. Given that woman is not *occasionata*, there is not a more perfect sex, and as such there must be some other basis for the domestic headship of man than a natural subjection based upon the premise of woman’s natural inferiority. Thomas’ concept of the teleology of sex can be expanded to its natural conclusion, such that as femininity is for motherhood and woman is for man, so also masculinity is for fatherhood and man is also for woman.

Why does it matter in the first place, though? What are the stakes? First, it matters because this is no narrow issue for serious students of St. Thomas. Thomas’ treatments of many other important philosophical and theological questions are also intertwined with the same errors regarding the generation process in varying degrees: the transmission of original sin, the moral life, political and family life, Christology, soteriology, the sacramental theology of marriage and Holy Orders, and others. The pressing “beginning-of-life” questions of our day--abortion, in-vitro fertilization, cloning, embryonic stem cell research--make such a review of Thomas’ anthropology all the more necessary. Secondly, this kind of study is important for those who are hoping to enrich a Christian feminism based on the tradition for which St. Thomas is an eminent spokesman, for two reasons. In the first place, there are many feminists who question the validity of any approach based upon St. Thomas and some who reject such altogether, and a Christian

¹⁷⁹ C.S. Lewis, *Mere Christianity*, Simon & Schuster, New York: 1980, 36.

¹⁸⁰ “*Quia parvus error in principio magnus est in fine...*” *De Ente et Essentia, Prooemium*, accessed May 1. 2013, <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/oe.html>

feminism cannot hope to be taken seriously if it has not worked through the weak points in one of its principal teachers. Last but not least, it is important because St. Thomas' account of human nature offers a rich, beautiful and expansive account of what it means to be a woman, one which offers an unparalleled foundation for a Christian feminism. Thomas considers woman in all her physical and spiritual makeup: as a creature of God, as an embodied spirit in the divine image, redeemed and ennobled by the Incarnate Word, and called to communion with God and her fellow creatures in the everlasting fellowship of heaven. He considers her in her human relationships, as a daughter, sister, mother, wife, and friend, and in her characteristically feminine activities. His theological anthropology offers a broad, open, and solid foundation for a genuine Christian feminism. Though it is unavoidable that scholars writing on other issues would often have to make note of the troublesome passages in St. Thomas and then move on (and admittedly there are many important questions of much greater inherent interest than one weak point in Thomas' anthropology), it would be a loss to Thomists and a loss to men and women if the kind of difficult pruning work attempted here were permanently neglected.

Any theological or philosophical project has to pass over many more issues than it can raise. The goal of this study has been to prepare the way for further study of men and women as *imago Dei* based on the principles of St. Thomas, and the concept of the image of God in men and women is an area of Thomas' thought which is beautiful and ennobling but which still stands greatly in need of clarification and development. That Thomas' account of the *imago* is so profoundly influenced by St. Paul, and is developed in his commentary on 1 Corinthians indicates that a pressing avenue of study is a serious theological reading of the New Testament epistles in conversation with St. Thomas and the tradition.¹⁸¹ With the benefit of clearer scientific

¹⁸¹ This work is already underway. Cf. Francis Martin, *The Feminist Question: Feminist Theology in the Light of Christian Tradition*, Eerdmans Publishing Co: 1995

data, it is necessary to seek, as Thomas did, the wisdom principle of the revelation that man and woman are the image of God, yet with some element of distinction. Another direction for further study is the thought of John Paul II on human communion as the image of God, particularly the self-giving spousal love of man and woman. In fact, it has been the conscious design of this present study to prepare the way for a fuller understanding of the theology of the body in its continuity with the thought of St. Thomas. It was with this future study in mind that we set out to discover what Thomas holds concerning the image of God in man and woman, and the revised teleology of masculinity and femininity with its corollary of the mutual “for” is an important first step in this direction.

If we have dwelt in this study on a weak point in Thomas’ theological anthropology, it was with the aim of building on his work, not tearing it down. The intention has been to seek with Thomas the wisdom principle behind the revealed affirmation that *God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them*. This present work will only really bear fruit if it aids the fuller discovery and contemplation of the wisdom and love which created men and women in the image of the Triune God.

Bibliography

Allen, R.S.M., Prudence. *The Concept of Woman: The Aristotelian Revolution, 750 B.C.-A.D.*

1250. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997.

-----“Philosophy of Relation in John Paul II’s New Feminism,” *Women in Christ*, ed. Michele

M. Schumacher. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans: 2004, 67-104.

Aquinas, Thomas. *Aquinas’ Shorter Summa: Saint Thomas’ Own Concise Version of His Summa*

Theologica. Ed. Trans. Cyril Vollert, SJ. Manchester: Sophia Institute Press, 2002.

---*Commentary on the Gospel of John*. Part II: Chapters 8-21. Translated by Fabian R. Larcher,

Albany: O.P. Magi Books, Inc., 1998.

-----*Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics*. Trans. Richard J. Regan. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007.

-----*Compendium Theologiae*. Liber I. Accessed May 1, 2013.

<http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/ott1185.html>.

-----*De Ente et Essentia*. Accessed May 1, 2013. <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/oe.html>

-----*Expositio in Symbolum Apostolorum*. Accessed May 1, 2013.

<http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/csv.html>.

----- *Sententia libri Ethicorum*. Liber VIII. Accessed May 1, 2013.

<http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/ctc08.html>.

-----*Sententia libri Metaphysicae*. Liber XI. Accessed May 1, 2013.

<http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/cmp11.html>.

-----*Sententia libri Politicorum*. Accessed May 1, 2013.

<http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/cpo.html>.

-----*Summa Theologiae*. Accessed May 1, 2013. <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html>.

-----*Summa Theologiae*. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Christian Classics: 1981.

-----*Summa Contra Gentiles*. Accessed May 1, 2013. Accessed May 1, 2013.

<http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html>.

-----*Summa Contra Gentiles*. Ed. Kenny, Joseph. Books III-IV. Trans. Vernon Burke, Charles O'Neill. New York: Hanover House, 1955-57.

-----*Super I Epistolam B. Pauli ad Timotheum Lectura*. Accessed May 1, 2013.

<http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/ct1.html>.

-----*Super I Epistolam B. Pauli Ad Corinthios*. Accessed May 1, 2013.

<http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/c1r.html>.

-----*Super Ioannem*. Accessed May 1, 2013. <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/cjo03.html>,

<http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/cjo12.html>.

-----*Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Galata*. Accessed May 1, 2013.

<http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/cgl.html>

Aristotle. *On the Generation of Animals*. Trans. A. L. Peck. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953.

-----*Nichomachean Ethics*. Trans. H. Rackham. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

-----*Politics*. Trans. H. Rackham. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.

Børresen, Kari Elisabeth. *Subordination and Equivalence: the Nature and Role of Woman in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas*. Trans. Charles H. Talbot. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981.

“Christian Feminism: A Fuller View of Woman.” *Zenit* Interview with Pia de Solenni. 2002.

<http://www.catholiceducation.org/articles/feminism/fe0022.html>.

Członkowska, Anna, Ciesielska, Agnieszka, Gromadzka, Grazyna, and Kurkowska-Jastrzębska,

Iwona. "Gender differences in neurological disease." *Endocrine* 29(2) 2006: 243-256.

De Solenni, Pia F. "A Hermeneutic of Aquinas' Mens through a Sexually Differentiated

Epistemology: Towards an Understanding of Woman as *Imago Dei*." S.T.D. Diss.,

Pontifical University of the Holy Cross, 2000.

Defarrari, Roy J. *Latin-English Dictionary of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Daughters of St Paul: Boston,

1986.

Favazza, Armando R. "Feral and isolated children." *British Journal of Medical Psychology*.

50(1): 1977. 105–111.

Feingold, Alan. "Cognitive gender differences are disappearing," *American Psychologist* 43(2)

1988: 95-103.

Ferguson, M. W. J., and Joanen, T. "Temperature of egg incubation determines sex in Alligator

mississippiensis," *Nature* 296 (1982):850-852. doi:10.1038/296850a0

Genesis 1-11. Ed. Louth, Andrew. *Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture: Old Testament*,

Volume I. IVP Academic, 2001.

Gondreau, Paul. *The Passions of Christ's Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Munster:

Druckhaus Aschendorff, 2002.

Gur, R. C., Mozley, P. D., Resnick, S. M., Gottlieb, G. L., Kohn, M., Zimmerman, R., Herman,

G., Atlas, S., Grossman, R., Berretta, D. "Gender differences in age effect on brain

atrophy measured by magnetic resonance imaging," *PNAS--Proceedings of the National*

Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 88(7) 1991: 2845–2849.

- Halpern, Diane F., Benbow, Camilla P., Geary, David C., Gur, Ruben C., Hyde, Janet Shibley, and Gernsbacher, Morton Ann. "The Science of Sex Differences in Science and Mathematics," *Psychological Science in the Public Interest* 8(2007): 1-51.
- Hankin, Benjamin L. and Abramson, Lyn Y. "Development of gender differences in depression: An elaborated cognitive vulnerability–transactional stress theory." *Psychological Bulletin* 127(6) 2001: 773-796.
- Hartel, Joseph F. *Femina Ut Imago Dei in the Integral Feminism of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Rome: Pontifical Gregorian University, 1993.
- "The Integral Feminism of St. Thomas Aquinas." *Gregorianum*. Vol. 7. Fasc. 3 (1996), <http://www.laici.org/hartel1.pdf>.
- Hyde, Janet Shibley; Mezulis, Amy H.; Abramson, Lyn Y. "The ABCs of depression: Integrating affective, biological, and cognitive models to explain the emergence of the gender difference in depression." *Psychological Review*, Vol 115(2), Apr 2008.
- Hyde, Janet S., Fennema, Elizabeth, and Lamon, Susan J. "Gender differences in mathematics performance: A meta-analysis." *Psychological Bulletin*, 107(2) 1990: 139-155.
- John Paul II. *Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body*. Trans. Michael Waldstein. Pauline Books & Media: Boston, 2006.
- Homily for the Inauguration of his pontificate, St. Peter's Square, Sunday, 22 October 1978. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/homilies/1978/documents/hf_jp-ii_hom_19781022_inizio-pontificato_en.html.

-----*Evangelium Vitae*.

http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html.

-----*Mulieris Dignitatem*.

http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_15081988_mulieris-dignitatem_en.html.

Jones, Peter E. "Contradictions and Unanswered Questions in the Genie Case: A Fresh Look at the Linguistic Evidence." *Language & Communication* 15(3):1995. 261-280.

Kolb, Brian & Whishaw, Ian. *An Introduction to Brain and Behavior*. 2nd ed. New York: Worth Publishers, 2006.

Lewis, C.S. *Mere Christianity*. Simon & Schuster, New York: 1980.

Lonergan, Bernard. "Finality, Love, Marriage." *Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan*. Ed. F. E. Crowe. Herder and Herder, New York: 1967, 16-53.

Luders, Eileen et al. "Gender differences in cortical complexity," *Nature Neuroscience* 7 (2004): 799 – 800.

Martin, Francis, *The Feminist Question: Feminist Theology in the Light of Christian Tradition*, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995

McInerny, Ralph, ed. *The Writings of Charles de Koninck*. Vol. 2. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008.

McGowan, Richard J. "The Imperfection of Woman in Thomas's Doctrine of Woman." Ph.D. diss., Marquette University, 1985.

Nolan, Michael. "The Aristotelian Background to Aquinas' Denial that 'Woman is a Defective Male,'" *The Thomist* (64): 2000, 21-69.

-----“What Aquinas Never Said About Women.” *First Things*. 1998.

<http://www.firstthings.com/article/2009/03/003-what-aquinas-never-said-about-women->

[38.](http://www.firstthings.com/article/2009/03/003-what-aquinas-never-said-about-women-)

Popik, Kristin M. “The Philosophy of Woman of St. Thomas Aquinas.” Part I. *Faith & Reason*

IV(4) 1978, 16-56. Part II. *Faith and Reason* V (1979): 40-70.

Rahner, Karl, Ed. *The Sources of Catholic Dogma*. Herder: Freiburg, 1954. Trans. Roy J.

Deferrari. 1955.

Stein, Edith. *Essays on Woman*. 2nd ed. Trans. Freda Mary Oben. ICS Publications: Washington,

D.C. 1996.

Summers, Lawrence H. “Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying the Science &

Engineering Workforce,” Cambridge, Mass., January 14, 2005.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20080130023006/http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/2005/nber.html>.

Vollmer Coles, Beatriz. “New Feminism: A Sex-Gender Reunion.” *Women in Christ*. Ed.

Michele M. Schumacher, Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, 2004, pp. 52-66.